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Changing Codes and Changing Constitutions 
Hoi Kong* 
In this article, the author addresses a neglected area of study, namely 
codal amendment in Canada. The author argues that the theoreiical justi-
ficaiions for the Civil Code of Québec and its distinctive design features 
raise concerns about how the Code is currently amended. In response to 
these concerns, the author draws on the rich literature concerning law 
reform in Canada to propose a reform institute that is charged with over-
seeing the process of codal amendment. Moreove,, the author contends 
that when Canadian courts and Parliament respond to and the Quebec 
legislature effecss changes to codal text they should be closely atteniive to 
the purposes underlying the constitutional division of powers. To iilustrate 
this last contention, the author critiques the Federal Law — Civil Law 
Harmonization Act, No. 1 and recent legislative and judicial developments 
respeciing marriage and the civil union. 
L’auteur s’intéresse à une question peu étudiée, soit celle des 
modifications apportées à un code civil. La façon dont le Code civil du 
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Québec est actuellement modiféé soulève des inquiétudss tant au regard 
de motifs théoriques qu’en raison de la spécificité de ce qu’est un code. 
Auss,, l’auteur attire l’atteniion sur l’abondanee littérature qui traite de 
la réforme du droit au Canada et propose la création d’un institut qui 
serait chargé de survelller le processus de modification du Code. De 
plus, il souligne l’importanee pour les juges, le Parlement du Canada et 
l’Assemblée nationale de respecter la finalité qui sous-tend le partage 
des pouvoirs étabii par la constitution. Pour illustrer ses propos, l'auteur 
prend en considération la Loi d’harmonisation no 1 du droit fédéral avec 
le droit civil, de même que les récentes décisions judiciaires et lois qui ont 
porté sur le mariage et l’union civile. 
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In 2001 and 2002, the Barreau du Québec published two memoranda 
that raised issues relevant to the present paper. The first1 critiqued the 
proposed Bill 50, An Act to Amend the Civil Code and other legislative 
1. Mémorre sur la Loi modifiant le Code civil (p. l. 50), online : [http ://www.barreau.qc.ca/ 
opinions/memoires/2001/pl50.pdf] (date accessed: 27 February, 2005). 
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provisions2 for failing to pay sufficient attention to the Civil Code of 
Québec’s3 internal structure, and advocated in passing the creation of a 
law reform institute that could superintend the process of amending the 
C.C.Q. A second memorandum4 concerning the proposed Bill 84, An Act 
instituting civil unions and estabiishing new rules of filiaiion expressed 
concern that extending eligibility for civil unions to heterosexual couples 
might result in the Bill’s being found to be ultra vires. 
With these interventions, the Barreau addressed a neglected topic of 
study, namely codal amendment in Canada. There is an extensive literature 
on the related question of recodification that was produced in anticipation 
of and in response to the coming into force of the C.C.Q.6 And there is a 
growing literature addressing the question of how to harmonize federal 
statutes with the C.C.Q.7 By contrast, the academy has been silent on 
the theory and process of codal amendment and the potential federalism 
concerns raised by codal amendments8. The present paper begins to fill 
this gap in the literature and its concerns mirror the three aspects of the 
Barreau’s interventions. 
In each of the first two sections, I will situate the particular issue 
under consideration—amending the C.C.Q. and designing a codal reform 
2. S.Q. 2002, c. 19. 
3. [hereinafter C.C.Q.]. 
4. Mémorre sur la Loi instituant V union civile des personnss de même sexe et établissant des 
nouvelles règles de filiation, online : [http ://www.barreau.qc.ca/opinions/memoires/2002/  
pl_84.pdf] (date accessed: 27 February, 2005). 
5. S.Q. 2002, c. 6. 
6. See e.g. J.E.C. BRIeRLEY, “Quebec’s Civil Law Codification: Viewed and Reviewed”, 
(1968) 14 McGlll L.J. 521 [hereinafter “Codificaiion"] ; P.-A. CRÉPeAU, “Les enjeux de 
la révision du Code civil”, in A. POUPART (ed.), Les enjeux de la révision du Code civil, 
Montréal, Faculté d’éducation permanente, Université de Montréal, 1979, 11; J.-L. 
BAUDOUIN, “Codification : méthode législative”, in Codification : valeurs et langage, 
Papers presented at the International Conference on Comparative Civil Law, 1-3 October 
1981, Montreal, Conseil de la langue française, 1985 ; J.E.C. BRIeRLEY, “The Renewal of 
Quebec’s Distinct Legal Culture: The New Civil Code of Quebec”, (1992) 42 U.T.L.J. 
484 ; J.-F. NIORT, “Le Nouveau Code civil du Québec et la théorie de la codification : une 
perspective française", (1996) 24 Droits: revue française de théorie juridique 135 ; J.-F. 
Niort, “Le Code civil face aux défis de la société moderne : une perspective comparative 
entre la révision de 1904 et le nouveau Code civil du Québec de 1994”, (1994) 39 McGill 
L.J. 845 [hereinafter “Moderne”]. 
7. See Section III below, and accompanying notes. 
8. For an analysis of the federalism concerns implicated in the relationship between 
Quebec’s civilian private law system and judicial and legislative regulation with a federal 
scope, see C. VALCKe, “Quebec’s Civil Law and Canadian Federalism”, (1996) 21 Yale 
J. Int’l L. 67. 
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agency—in wider debates about codal and law reform. I will argue that 
the process of codal amendment raises particular concerns about expertise 
and legitimacy, and I will argue that a well-designed codal reform agency 
can meet these. In the third section, I will argue that in addition to these 
theoretical and design-related issues, the logic and structure of codal change 
raise particular division of powers questions. From my analysis of two 
issues, marriage and civil unions, I will conclude that when Canadian legis-
latures and courts effect or respond to codal change, they should be espe-
cially attentive to positive law and principle-driven constraints imposed 
by division of powers doctrine. Each section of my paper presupposes an 
understanding of the nature of a civil code, and it is this understanding that 
I will begin by setting out. 
1 Codal Theory and Codal Change 
A civil code is unique among legislative texts. A civil code aims to state 
exhaustively the jus commune of a jurisdiction9, and therefore presents 
the default conceptual apparatus of a jurisdiction’s private law system10. 
A civil code encapsulates the essential features of its society by regulating 
behaviour11 and aspires to be “a civil constitution.”12 It seeks to represent 
9. This feature is explicitly stated in the preamble to the C.C.Q. : “The Civil Code comprises 
a body of rules which, in all matters within the letter, spirit or object of its provisions, 
lays down the jus commune, expressly or by implication.” Given the reach of the C.C.Q.’ s 
coverage, I take this to be a statement about the exhaustive ambitions of the Code. These 
ambitions are not fully realized, as the preamble itself acknowledges when it alludes to 
the Quebec Charter and general principles of law. Some statutes and some unwritten 
principles share foundational status with the C.C.Q. 
10. This ambition is evident when the preamble states : “In these matters, the Code is the 
foundation of all other laws ...” The point in the above text about default vocabularies 
is one that Professor Macdonald has explored in general in R.A. MaCDONALD, “Legal 
Bilingualism”, (1997) 42 McGill L.J. 119 and in the particular context of the Code. R.A. 
MaCDONALD, “Harmonizing the Concepts and Vocabulary of Federal and Provincial 
Law: The Unique Situation of Quebec Civil Law”, in The Harmonization of Federal 
Legislation with Quebec Civil Law and Canadian Bijuralism, Ottawa, Department of 
Justice, 1997, 27 [hereinafter “Harmonizing”]. 
11. For a comparison of the different distributional logics present in the C.C.Q. and Civil 
Code of Lower Canada, and the divergent social values they encapsulate, see C. VALCKe, 
“The Unhappy Marriage of Corrective and Distributive Justice in the New Civil Code 
of Quebec”, (1996) 46 U.T.L.J. 539. 
12. J. CARBoNNIer, “Le Code civil”, in P. NORA (ed.), Les lieux de mémoire, vol. 2, La Nation, 
Paris, Gallimard, 1986. 
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the normative character of the society in which it is found13 and in the 
exercise of this vocation, it is both a symbol and an instrument14. Through 
the operation of synecdoche, a single codal provision, governing a fragment 
of social life, can capture a society’s character. 
For example, the differences between the regimes of responsibility 
for the act of a thing in the Civil Code of Lower Canada15 and the C.C.Q. 
reflect a fundamental shift from a rural to an industrial society16. Art. 1465 
of the C.C.Q. regulates behavior ; it imposes a presumption of fault on a 
custodian for the autonomous act of a thing. But at the same time, Art. 1465 
evidences a change in historical circumstances and conceptions of fair-
ness. As Professors Baudouin and Deslauriers have noted, the clear codal 
statement of this presumption reflects a legislative acknowledgment of the 
growing danger that inanimate objects pose in an industrial society17. By 
lessening the onus of proof for injured parties seeking recovery, the article 
places the costs of this greater risk onto the custodian and thus expresses 
a particular notion of distributive justice. 
In addition to these symbolic and regulative functions, a code, as a 
civil constitution, has several distinctive design features. Like all constitu-
tions, a civil code pitches many of its rules at a high level of generality18. 
The reason for this is two-fold. First, a code sets the framework within 
which parties structure their relations. Unlike the archetypal statute, a code 
generally does not envision a particular fact situation, or seek a particular 
outcome19. The second point relates to form. Like a common law rule, 
13. Ibid. See generally J.E.C. BRIerLEY & R.A. MaCDONALD, Quebec Civil Law: An Intro-
duction to Quebec Private Law, Toronto, Edward Montgomery, 1993, at paras. 32, 36-41, 
85-90. See also P. LEGRAND, “Antiqui Juris Civilis Fabulas”, (1995) 45 U.T.L.J. 311 for 
both an exposition and deconstruction of the following attributes of a civil code. 
14. On these two functions of legal rules in general, see F. SCHAUer, Playing by the Rules, 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991. On the symbolic function of civil codes and the semiotic 
stakes implicated by codal change, see M. M C a u L E Y , “Proposal for a Theory and a 
Method of Recodification”, (2003) 49 Loy. L. Rev. 261. 
15. [hereinafter C.C.L.C.]. 
16. J.-L. BAUDOUIN & P. DESLAURIERS, La Responsabilité civile, 5th ed., Cowansville, Yvon 
Blais, 1998 at 467-71. 
17. Ibid. 
18. J.-E.-M. PORTALIS, “Qu’est-ce qu’un Code civil: discours préliminaire sur le projet de 
code civil français prononcé par Portalis”, in P.A. F e n e t (ed.), Naissance du Code Civil : 
La raison du législateu,, Paris, Flammarion, 1989, 35 at 39-42. On how constitutional 
and codal text resemble one another in ambition and scope, see K.N. LLEWELLYN, “The 
Constitution as an Institution”, (1934) 34 Colum. L Rev. 1 at 11. 
19. For the idea of an archetypal statute, see R.A. MaCDONALD, “The Fridge-Door Statute”, 
(2001) 47 McGill L.J. 11 at 13. For an analysis of the appeal of civil codes in jurisdictions 
where statutes are the dominant legislative form, and for a comparison of statutes and 
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a codal provision generally applies to a wide variety of circumstances. 
But like a statutory rule and unlike a common law rule, a codal provi-
sion has a fixed canonical rendering20. Taken together, these features of a 
code ensure its capacity to adapt to societal change, without having to be 
constantly amended21. This is significant because any constitutional text, 
civil or otherwise, whose form can be constantly changed loses its status 
as the repository of its society’s values22. 
This capacity to adapt can be fulfilled through means other than 
generalized rules. A code achieves flexibility through bivocality23. That 
is, it contains within itself creative tensions which invite the judiciary to 
draw upon opposing possibilities as societal values shift in one direction or 
another. The classic example in the C.C.L.C. is the tension between fault-
and risk-based regimes of liability24. Over time, judicial interpretations 
found textual support in the code for one regime or the other25. 
A code is not, however, infinitely extensible, and the regulatory func-
tion of a codal regime becomes most evident at precisely the moment 
when its symbolic function fails. For example, the symbolic affirmations of 
civil codes, see G.A. WEISS, “The Enchantment of Codification in the Common Law 
World”, (2000) 25 Yale J. of Inf I L. 435. 
20. On this comparison between common law and statutory rules, see L.L. FuLLER, Anatomy 
of the Law, Westport, Conn., Greenwood, 1968, at 89-99. On the comparison between 
civil code provisions and common law rules, see F. STONE, “A Primer on Codification” 
(1955) 29 Tulane L. Rev. 303. 
21. See BRIerLEY & MaCDONALD, supra, note 13 at paras. 117, 118. 
22. Professors Fletcher and Sheppard note that this concern for stability of form is particu-
larly evident in the U.S. Constitution : when it is amended to render provisions null, those 
provisions are not excised from the Constitutional text. G. FLETCher & S. ShePPARd, 
American Law in a Global Contex,, New York, Oxford University Press, 2005, at 135. 
See e.g. the infamous 3/5ths clause of art. I, § 2, cl. 3. The same impulse is present in 
the tendency of civil code amenders to introduce sub-sections to retain the numerical 
sequence of codal provisions, rather than amending in a way that would disrupt this 
ordering through, for instance, appendices. See e.g. Art. 587.1, 587.2 and 587.3 of the 
C.C.Q. 
23. For the idea of bivocality, and its significance generally in systems of legal thought, see 
MaCDONALD, infra, note 77 at 876. 
24. For an analysis of this quality of ambiguity in the C.C.Q. see J. PTNEAU, Le nouveau Code 
civil et les intentions du législateur, Montreal, Thémis, 2000, at 10. On the point in the 
context of extra-contractual liability, see D. JuTRAS, “Louis and the Mechanical Beast or 
Josserand’s Contribution to Objective Liability in France”, in K. COOPER-StePHenSON 
& E. GIBSON (eds.), Tort Theory, North York, Capital Press, 1994, 317. 
25. See the discussion of this debate in Lapierre v. Quebec, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 241. Foradiscus-
sion of the unresolved tension between provisions promoting and limiting individual 
autonomy in the C.C.Q., see J. PINEAU, D. BURMAN & S. GAUDET, Théorie des obliga-
tions, 3d ed., Montreal, Thémis, 1996, at 23-29. 
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patriarchy within the C.C.L.C. constituted material limits on the capacity 
of women to act independently. By the time of the 1980 reform, these 
regulatory limits had become vividly noticeable as the symbolic content 
of the rules in the book on marriage failed to capture the social mores of 
the context26. Arguably, the absence of articles expressly governing same 
sex relationships constituted a similar symbolic and regulatory gap in the 
C.C.Q. 
Finally, any analysis of the idea of a code must address the aesthetics 
of a code. Codal substance is inseparable from codal form27. The C.C.Q.’s 
pretension to forming an elegant and coherent whole28 is evidenced in the 
sequential ordering of its provisions29, in the preliminary disposition30, and 
in explicit cross-references31. 
1.1 Debating Codal Change 
The above defining features of a civil code have given rise to debates 
over whether and how to alter codal text. The normative vocation of a code, 
the pitch and creative possibilities of its text and the inter-relatedness of its 
articles and regimes, have all raised concerns about the capacity of a legis-
lature to alter a code’s form. I present two polar positions on the question 
of codal reform, and then turn to an analysis of how these positions bear 
on the current state of codal amendment in Quebec. I acknowledge that 
the authors whom I invoke as representatives of the poles of the debate 
wrote in their particular socio-legal and historical contexts and I do not 
26. For this history see Part Two, Title Four of BRIerLEY & MaCDONALD, supra, note 13. 
27. In a forthcoming article, Macdonald and I flesh out the significance of different forms of 
codal rules, as we set out a typology of codal reform measures and argue that different 
kinds of provisions and amendments give rise to different institutional and substantive 
effects. R.A. MaCDONALD & H. KONG, “Patchwork Law Reform: your idea is good in 
practice, but it won’t work in theory” (forthcoming) Osgoode Hall L.J. 
28. Cornu has described this quality of a civil code using the apt phrase “internal harmony.” 
G. CoRNU, “Codification contemporaine: valeurs et langage”, in L’art du droit en quête 
de sagesse, Paris, P.U.F., 1998, 357 at 367. See also supra, note 13. 
29. On the relationship between the organization of statutory texts and their meaning gener-
ally, see D. MANDERSON, “Statuta v. Acts : Interpretation, Music and Early English 
Legislation”, (1995) Yale J. of L. & Human 317. On this relationship in the specific 
context of civil codes see M C a u L E Y supra note 14. 
30. Professor Bisson reads this quality in the phrase “ensemble des règles.” A.-F. Bisson, “La 
disposition préliminaire du Code Civil du Québec”, (1999) 44 McGill L.J. 539 at 557. 
31. See e.g. Arts. 521.6, 521.11, 930, 1109, 1222, 1258, 1262, 1263, 1484, 1671, 1709, and 1743. 
The scope of Articles 1-9 reaches all relevant provisions of the Code. 
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deny the specificity of the C.C.Q.’s context32. Vast temporal, geographical 
and cultural differences separate the writings of the authors invoked and 
the Quebec experience with codal amendment. But these writings are here 
deployed for a limited purpose. I offer them as ideal types through which 
to frame the question of codal reform, and by contrasting them, I hope to 
bring to light the philosophical and institutional stakes that underlie serious 
discussions of the means and ends of C.C.Q. amendment. 
Perhaps the most eloquent opponent of codal reform was Planiol, and 
his objections moved along several lines33. First, for Planiol the French 
Civil Code was the civil constitution ; more than capturing the character 
of a particular civil society, codal provisions were abstract formulations of 
fundamental and unchanging concepts of private law34. Because the Code 
articulated these fundamental concepts, it should not be altered. 
Second, the Civil Code deserved deference as a repository of accumu-
lated social wisdom35. For Planiol, codal provisions expressed the moral 
experience of a society, and could generally be relied on to determine 
outcomes. Only in exceptional circumstances, when that accumulated 
wisdom could by broad consensus be unmistakably shown to be folly, 
should an established rule be amended. The Code should not be altered 
since the weight of its accumulated wisdom placed an almost insurmount-
able burden of proof upon the reformer. 
Planiol’s third objection to codal reform was institutional in nature. 
There were for Planiol three institutional players to be taken into account 
when considering codal reform. First was the legislature36. As noted above, 
a legislature creating an archetypal statute responds to a particular problem. 
Such a legislature, noted Planiol, inevitably operates in an experimental 
and tentative mood. It proceeds by trial and error, and its very composi-
tion shifts according to prevailing political attitudes. Faced with the task 
32. On the significance of sensitivity to culture when undertaking legal scholarship that has 
a comparative dimension, see generally V. GROSSWALD CuRRAN, “Cultural Immersion, 
Difference and Categories in U.S. Comparative Law”, (1998) 46 Am. J. of Comp. Law 
43 ; P. LEGRAND, “The Impossibility of Legal Transplants”, (1997) 4 Maastricht J. Eur. 
& Comp. Law 123 ; W. EWaLD, “Comparative Jurisprudence I : What Was It Like to Try 
a Rat?”, (1995) 143 U. Pa. L Rev. 1889. 
33. M. PLANIOl, “L’inutilité d’une révision générale du Code civil”, in Le Code civil, 1804-
1904: livre du centenaire, vol. 2, Paris, Rousseau, 1904, 953. 
34. Ibid. at 960. 
35. Ibid. 
36. luid. at 9jy. 
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of altering the fundamental principles evinced by the code, the legislature, 
for Planiol, was incapable by nature of undertaking codal revision37. 
Whereas the legislature was by nature and function unable to change 
the content of a code, the judiciary, through its interpretations, makes such 
change superfluous. Planiol argued that it was the proper role of judicial 
interpretation to enable a code to meet changed circumstances38. As Witt-
genstein noted, no rule can anticipate all of its possible applications and 
the content of any rule arises from the practices of its community ; for 
Wittgenstein, the practice is the rule39. Similarly, for Planiol, the practice 
of judicial interpretation of the Civil Code was the codal rule. As a conse-
quence, the “literal” meaning of a rule could be the precise opposite of the 
“actual” meaning that it was given by the judiciary40. 
Finally, if the judiciary gave the codal rule its content, the third insti-
tutional actor in the codal universe, the doctrinal writer, gave a rule its 
justification. Although for Planiol judicial interpretation was the primary 
practice that gave a rule content, given the form of the French civilian 
judgment, such interpretation could not invest a rule with the full plenitude 
of its content41. The full reason for a codal rule could emerge only with 
doctrinal interpretation. Acting together, the civil law judge and doctrinal 
writer could adapt a code to changing times42, and when their interpretive 
acts are considered in light of legislative incapacity to amend a code, argued 
Planiol, one should conclude that they make legislative changes to codal 
text unnecessary. 
The arguments against codal reform mirror the arguments for codal 
reform. If Planiol conceived a code to be the civil constitution, the propo-
nents of reform, most notably de la Morandière, presented a code as a civil 
37. This is not to say that such temporary measures are unnecessary. The legislature can, 
through ordinary statutes, create regimes that complement the Code. In fact, given 
Planiol’s understanding of the Code as a permanent repository of social wisdom, and 
his recognition that normal legislative practice reflects transitory interests, a division 
of labor between a code and a statute is a reasonable proposition. The experimentation 
that emerges from transient moments of social consensus can properly be kept out of 
the Code and displaced into a statute. 
38. Supra, note 33 at 958. 
39. L. WITTGENSTEIN, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford, 
Blackwell, 1999, at paras. 85-86. A similar point is made in the context of constitutional 
interpretation by LLEWELLYN, supra, note 18. Llewellyn locates much of a constitution’s 
meaning in institutional practices, rather than constitutional text. 
40. Supra, note 33 at 959. 
41. But see VALCKe, supra, note 8 for the distinctive features of judgments in Quebec civil 
law. 
42. Supra, note 33 at 959. 
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constitution43. Since a code’s rules represent and constitute the character 
of its society, and do not form the foundations of private law itself, when 
society changes, so too must the rules44. Whereas Planiol saw in the provi-
sions of the French Civil Code eternal verities, de la Morandière saw in 
them contingent expressions of social norms45. 
Two additional differences lie between the opponent and proponent 
of codal reform. First, even if one were to accept the claim that a code 
represents the accumulated wisdom of its society, and that therefore one 
should presume that a code ought not be altered, one could still, in the 
face of dramatic social changes, argue that the presumption can be deci-
sively rebutted. For example, at the time of Planiol’s writing it was unclear 
whether mass democracy would represent a permanent change, rather than 
an anomalous historical moment, and whether the Code should respond 
to this change By contrast when de la Morandière was writing in 1948 
the question was decided. He noted the change in the state’s role from a 
passive observer of the free market’s activities to an active distributor of 
economic goods and social resources. In light of these changes and even if 
one were to accept Planiol’s conservative moral vision the wisdom accu-
mulated in the Code and therefore the Code itself could be legitimately 
questioned46 
The contemporary example would be the civil union. To the extent 
that neither the federal nor provincial legislative regimes governing conjugal 
relationships accommodated the perceived needs of same sex partnerships, 
the C.C.Q., as a civil constitution, arguably correctly filled the gap. Again, a 
decisive shift in social consensus required a recasting of the conventional 
wisdom as captured in the Code. 
Second, reformers, and Quebec reformers in particular, can respond 
to each of Planiol’s institutional arguments. The claim concerning the 
inability of the legislature to undertake codal reform at all can be chal-
lenged at several points. To begin, the legislature, whether in France or 
Quebec, already has amended the code a number of times. Consequently, 
the argument that a legislature is ill-equipped to reform a code today no 
43. L.J. de LA MoRANDIÈRE, “The Reform of the French Civil Code”, (1948) 97 U. Penn. L. 
Rev. 1. 
44. Ibid. at 8-10. 
45. Ibid. at 5. 
46. On the influence of this progressive, modernity-influenced theory on Quebec and French 
jurisprudence, see Moderne , supra, note 6. 
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longer refutes the possibility of codal reform but calls for a better process 
of reform47. 
In addition, examination of the Quebec experience with codal reform 
can turn Planiol’s arguments about the proper roles of the judiciary and 
doctrinal writers on their head. Even if we accept that the code requires the 
activity of the judiciary and commentators to make its provisions mean-
ingful, we can still argue that judicial and doctrinal writing can contribute to 
alterations in the codal text. This is what happened in Quebec. As Professor 
Jobin has noted, judicial and doctrinal concepts which filled in perceived 
gaps in the C.C.L.C. became themselves provisions in the C.C.Q. Among 
the clearest examples of this is the introduction of a concept of unjust 
enrichment into the C.C.Q48. 
1.2 Codal Amendment Today 
The counter-arguments detailed above answer the charge that change 
to codal text per se is normatively suspect, but they do not establish a case 
for unfettered legislative discretion when amending a civil code. Even if we 
moderns reject Planiol’s arguments about the foundational nature of a civil 
code, his concerns about legislative capacity to undertake codal change 
taken together with the above statement of codal theory counsel caution 
when one considers altering codal text. Since there is no movement for 
wholesale codal reform in Quebec today, the live question that emerges 
from the traditional debate is : how should codal amendment be under-
taken ? The Barreau’s intervention concerning the proposed Bill 50 and the 
Justice Minister’s response provide us an entry point into this question. 
47. Moreover, even if we accept that the proper role of the legislature is to introduce legis-
lation that regulates in parallel to a code, there are limits to which this activity can be 
undertaken before it undermines the legitimacy of the code itself. For instance, the 
construction of an extensive extra-codal regime of consumer law can threaten a code ; 
insofar as such a regime regulates the majority of transactions involving private citizens, 
it undercuts the claim that a code encapsulates the entire private law of its society. On 
the relative paucity of codal provisions seeking to protect consumers in the C.C.L.C, 
as compared to the extensive extra-codal regime, see J.-L. BAUDOUIN & P.-G. JoBIN, La 
Responsabilité civile, 5th ed., Cowansville, Yvon Blais, 1998, at 165-68. In addition, when 
such an influential extra-codal regime’s basic postulates diverge from those of the code, 
the legitimacy of the code’s postulates can be put into question. Ibid. If the majority of 
contracts which private individuals enter into are governed by a regime of protection, 
rather than autonomy, then the codal claim that autonomy of the will is the foundation 
of contract law is made risible. 
48. P.-G. JoBIN, “La cour suprême et la réforme du Code Civil”, (2000) 79 Can. Bar. Rev. 27 
at 31. 
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When representatives of the Barreau initially appeared before the 
Commission Permanente des Institutions and presented the memorandum 
concerning the proposed Bill 50, they were met with some skepticism by 
the Justice Minister49. He understood the Barreau to be arguing simply 
that the C.C.Q. should not be altered50. He replied that for the C.C.Q. 
to respond to social change, its text would have to change, and that the 
legislative process was sufficient to achieve this end51. With his comments, 
the Minister simultaneously evinced de la Morandière’s position about the 
mutability of codal text and imputed Planiol’s conservative vision to the 
Barreau. In the following, I will outline several means of codal amendment 
and demonstrate how the traditional debate over codal change can inform 
an intelligent contemporary discussion about codal amendment. 
Contemporary codal reforms can be explicit or implicit. In explicit 
codal reform, the legislature alters the codal text. By contrast, implicit 
codal reform shapes or alters the substance of codal text while leaving its 
form untouched. Judges, acting solely or relying upon doctrinal writers, 
are the primary agents of this mode of reform as they interpret and apply 
the code52. 
The legislature can alter the explicit content of a code for symbolic 
ends. A textual amendment can target the code directly and primarily, with 
the aim of effecting a social policy and symbolic change. For instance, 
An act to amend the Civil Code as regards the obligaiion of support 
eliminated the support obligation between grandparents and grandchil-
dren. This textual change sought to protect the elderly from being finan-
cially burdened by claims from their grandchildren. Like pension plans 
and tax deductions, it is a policy instrument that targets regulation directly 
at a particular segment of the population. Textual amendments can effect 
symbolic change, while reflecting broad societal change. For example, with 
49. QUÉBeC, ASSEMBLÉe NATIOnALE, Index du Journal des débats - Participants, 36e lég., 
sess., Commission permanente des institutions, 27 mars 2002, online: [http://www. 
assnat.qc.ca/fra/Publications/debats/journal/ci/020327.htm] (date accessed : 27 February 
2005). 
50. Ibid. 
51. Ibid. 
52. I describe implicit codal reform measures in more detail in section II. I do not intend to 
argue that statements of judicial principle do not take a discernible form. When a court 
enunciates a principle in the context of codal interpretation, that principle becomes an 
explicit part of codal discourse. I label this mode of reform “implicit” because it does 
not alter the code’s express wording and cannot be discerned by simply reading the text, 
and to distinguish it from reform through legislative amendment. 
53. S.Q. 1996, c. 28, s. 1. 
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the addition of the second paragraph to Art. 108, the C.C.Q. acknowledged 
the increasing presence of populations that use linguistic symbols other 
than those found in French or English54. These populations are made the 
explicit objects of regulation, and one of the dividing lines between them 
and the majority groups is officially drawn on linguistic grounds. More than 
this, it is significant that the provision regulates only those who would name 
their children using the symbols of their own language. Insofar as the act of 
naming a child, like any culturally specific child-rearing practice, is an act 
of cultural affirmation the provision only affects those who would define 
themselves on linguistic grounds55. With this small change in the C.C.Q., 
language and naming are symbolically cognized as relevant grounds of 
cultural definition for both majority and minority cultures. 
The underlying rationale for these two cases of codal change was to 
adapt the code to meet either existing concerns that were not recognized at 
the time of the C.C.Q.’s drafting or concerns arising with subsequent social 
changes. These measures are consistent with the tenor of de la Morandière’ s 
arguments in favor codal reform, and the example of the civil union, which 
I will consider in Part III, is arguably another instance of codal change 
motivated by this rationale. The process of explicit codal amendment can, 
however, also give rise to the legitimate concerns expressed by traditional 
opponents of codal reform about the capacity of the legislature to under-
take such reform. 
Legislation can amend the code in response to discrete problems. For 
example, the proposed Bill 50 introduced a measure to alter the respon-
sibility of a vendor of an immovable (Art. 1726). This legislative change 
was not responsive to a general shift in social mores. Rather, the proposed 
amendment aimed to address a specific problem in the real estate industry 
and unlike for the above-cited examples the symbolic stakes in the area of 
law in question were relatively low56. The proposed amendment would have 
54. See also Art. 58. For an excellent discussion of the means by which the state deploys 
regulation of naming as an instrument of exclusion and assimilation, see T. SCASSA, 
“National Identity, Ethnic Surnames and the State”, (1996) 11 C.J.L.S. 167. For a strong 
critique of how language, and by extension linguistic affiliation, are made objects of 
regulation by the C.C.Q., see P. LEGRAND, “Codification and the Politics of Exclusion: 
A Challenge for Comparativists”, (1998) 31 U.C.D.L. Rev. 199. 
55. On the relevance of child-rearing practices to the cultural identity of a community, see S. 
VAN PRAAGH, “Faith, Belonging and the Protection of ‘Our’ Children”, (1999) 17 Windsor 
Y.B. Access Just. 154. 
56. In the late 1990’s, homeowners became aware of problems caused by backfill that 
included pyrite as one of its ingredients. This defect in construction was latent, and there-
fore regulated under Art. 1726. In addition, the defect was widespread, and the Barreau 
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imposed a five year limit on the capacity of a buyer to sue for latent defects 
in an immovable. In the Barreau’s memorandum, there were echoes of 
PlanioF s arguments concerning the inability of the legislature to adequately 
undertake codal reform. The Barreau du Québec’s memorandum argued 
that there was no compelling reason to alter the C.C.Q. when extra-codal 
legislation could and already had adequately regulated the problem57. This 
critique spoke to the inappropriateness of importing statutory measures 
into a code. The Barreau also argued that the amendment would confuse 
a regime of warranty with one of liability without attention to the logic of 
either. The memorandum argued that in so doing, the legislature demon-
strated its institutional incapacity with respect to codal amendment58. The 
legislative product evidenced insufficient expert attention, and by impli-
cation, the necessity of intervention by a body that could appreciate the 
internal logic and over-arching rationales for a code. 
The Minister of Justice responded to these critiques by affirming 
the adequacy of the legislative process and suggesting his openness to a 
more responsive process59. In subsequent remarks before the Commission 
Permanente des Institutions, he acknowledged the force of the Barreau’s 
critique and withdrew the amendment60. He thereby defused the insti-
tutional critique. To the extent that the criticism conflated arguments 
against the institutional capacity of the legislature with the substantive 
failings of the proposed bill, the Minister’s withdrawal of that bill defeated 
the former kind of argument. The legislative process was responsive to 
both the internal logic of the civil code and the opinions of experts. The 
Minister went further. He asserted that he was willing to consider a long-
term consultative process with the Barreau, to ensure that the process of 
codal amendment would approach the level of considered attention that 
the Barreau requested61. 
The examples of codal amendment responsive to social change 
described above and the exchange between the Barreau and the Minister 
argued that this was the particular motivating factor for the proposed amendment, which 
would limit vendors’ liability (supra, note 1). For background and legislative responses 
to the problem, see online: [http://www.consommateur.qc.ca/acqc] (date accessed: 27 
February, 2005). 
57. Supra, note 1. 
58. Ibid. 
59. QUEBeC, ASSEMBLÉe NATIOnALE, Index du Journal des débats - Participants, 36e lég., 
sess., Commission permanente des institutions, 7 juin 2\)\)L, online: [http://www. 
assnat.qc.ca/fra/Publications/debats/journal/ci/020607.htm] (date acessed: 27 February 
2005). 
60. Ibid. 
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highlight the stakes of codal reform and the limits of legislative capacity : 
the codal reformer should be sensitive to the progressivist logic of de la 
Morandière while acknowledging Planiol’s cautionary notes about institu-
tional competences. In his response to the Barreau’s concerns, the Minister 
did not openly consider the possibility of creating a law reform institute 
whose function would be to superintend codal change. Before considering 
the need for and design exigencies of such an institute, I insert two quali-
fications to the analysis thus far advanced. 
First, the above debate provides a framework for understanding codal 
amendment and is not intended to have uniform universal application : the 
salience of the overall framework and its components will vary according to 
historical and cultural context62. Second, although I have treated the above 
arguments as if they can be considered in abstraction from the individuals 
and institutions making them, it should be noted that the participants in this 
debate have very different political agendas. The Barreau’ s interests are not 
identical to the Minister of Justice’s and both differ from the scholar’s. A 
concern about this variety of interests has motivated law reform in Canada 
generally, and as we shall see now, is relevant to the question of the neces-
sity for and design of a codal reform institute. 
2 Instituting Codal Reform 
We have seen above that the traditional debates over codal change 
were directed primarily at explicit legislative reform of the codal text and 
we have considered the difficulties that attend the legislative process. Yet 
even if the arguments against exclusive reliance upon the legislative process 
were irrefutable, they would not decisively establish the case for a law 
reform body. For that argument to succeed, it must be shown that the 
agents of implicit codal reform are either unable to fill the gaps in the 
legislative process or suffer from additional flaws. I begin by considering 
the activities of the two institutions that effect this mode of reform, namely 
the judiciary and the university. 
2.1 Implicit Law Reform, Its Agencies and Shortcomings 
The reform efforts of the judiciary and academia can vest the codal 
text with meanings that are unduly restrictive, unduly expansive, or within 
the reasonable range between these extremes. In perhaps the most striking 
62. For the importance of considering variations in civilian discourse and practice across 
time and place, see R.A. MaCDONALd, “Understanding Quebec Civil Law Scholarship”, 
(1985) 23 U.T.L.J. 573. See also “Codification” supra, note 6. 
644 Les Cahiers de Droit (2005) 46 c. de D. 629 
example of an interpretation of the C.C.Q. that unduly constrained the text’s 
meaning, the Quebec Court of Appeal in Banque Nationaee du Canada 
v. Bitar63 relied on academic commentary and refused to acknowledge 
what the legislature manifestly stated to be the law. The Court held that 
despite the use of explicit language (“deemed”) which raises an irrebuttable 
presumption of fraud in Art. 1632 in circumstances where a contracting 
party knew the debtor to be insolvent, this article is incoherent because it 
denies the contracting party a defense of good faith. The incoherence arises 
not because of conflicting textual evidence within the C.C.Q., but rather 
because of a perceived failure of the article to cohere with previous juris-
prudence or academic opinion. The Court of Appeal, like Planiol’s judge, 
read against the text and effectively adopted a legislative role. 
More common are interpretive acts in which the judiciary, relying on 
academic commentary, legitimately fills in the content of a codal provision. 
A recent and somewhat banal example of this phenomenon is the case of 
St-Jean v. Mercier6,, where the Supreme Court of Canada resolved the 
question of whether causation in an analysis of delictual responsibility is 
a question of fact. The text of the code is unclear, and after weighing its 
own previous holdings and scholarly opinions, the Court affirmed that the 
determination of causation raises questions of fact and that, by contrast, 
the determination of fault raises a mixed question of fact and law. The 
academic commentary played a decisive role in the Court’s decision, as it 
did in Bitar. The reasoning and outcome in Bitar are as controversial as 
the reasoning and outcome in Mercier are uncontroversial. In the latter, 
the Court was faced with an unresolved textual ambiguity and resolved it 
by appeal to academic commentary. 
A third case presents an instance that is similar to Mercier but impor-
tantly distinguishable, as it purports to invest the judiciary with over-broad 
interpretive powers. In Epiciers Unis Métro-Richelieu Inc., division “Econ-
gros” v. Collin65 the Court was again faced with an unresolved debate about 
the meaning and scope of a provision. Again the Court resolved it in part by 
invoking academic commentators. The significant difference between this 
case and Mercier lies in the reasons advanced for the Court’s conclusion. 
The Court explicitly adopted an expansive interpretation of the C.C.Q., and 
of particular interest to this paper, invoked the logic and structure of the 
Code to do so. For the Court, LeBel J. wrote: 
63. [2000] RJ.Q. 658 (C.A.) [hereinafter Bitar]. 
64. [2002] 1 S.C.R. 491. 
DJ. [ZUU4] 3 S.CK. ZJ7 [hereinafter Epiciers]. 
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The Civil Code of Québec, which sets out the jus commune of that civil law 
province, must be interpreted liberally. In Doré v. Verdun (City), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 
862, Gonthier J. addressed this point, saying that “unlike statutory law, the Civil 
Code is not a law of exception, and this must be taken into account in interpreting 
it. It must be interpreted broadly so as to favour its spirit over its letter and enable 
the purpose of its provisions to be achieved.” (para. 20) 
LeBel J. purported to adopt such an expansive approach in inter-
preting Art. 2363 to apply to any suretyship attached to the performance of 
special duties, rather than restricting it to a limited set of classes of surety-
ships. Here again, the Court relied heavily on academic commentary66 and 
exhaustively canvassed arguments about legislative intent67. 
Yet it is unclear what precise role the appeal to an expansive approach 
to codal interpretation played in the Court’s determination of this case. 
The strategy of a large and liberal interpretation68 is often invoked in cases 
involving rights provisions, where the clear legislative purpose is to give 
citizens the “full measure” of rights guarantees69, or where the context 
that gives meaning to a particular, usually constitutional textual term, has 
decisively shifted over time70. In each of these situations, courts adopt an 
expansive interpretive approach to protect the underlying values of the 
text. In the case of rights provisions, the judiciary adopts an expansive 
interpretive stance to enable it to act as a counterweight to majoritarian 
measures threatening to the interests of vulnerable individuals. This judicial 
role has been understood to be mandated by the logic of rights discourse71. 
66. Ibid. at para. 32-35. 
67. Ibid. at para. 24-27, 43. 
68. One might interpret LeBel J. to be adopting a purposive, rather than expansive interpre-
tation (see BISSON, supra, note 30 for the distinction). Such an interpretation is uncon-
vincing. First, the ambiguity in the text and in the doctrinal literature implicated the 
question of what the purpose of the article was. A simple appeal to purposes in such a 
situation is an exercise in question-begging. Second, the quotation from Gonthier J. and 
the conclusion that LeBel J. arrived at concerned, respectively, the scope of interpreta-
tion and the scope of the term “suretyship” : both go to the extent of textual meaning, 
not its purpose. 
69. Hunter v. Southam, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 at 156. See also R. v. Big M. Drug Mart, [1985] 1 
S.C.R. 295 at 344 ; Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 at 509 ; United States 
of America v. Cotron,, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469 at 1480; Re Provincial Boundaries (Sask.), 
[1991] 2 S.C.R. 158 at 179. 
70. Edwards v. A.G. Canada, [1930] A.C. 124 at 136. See also infra, note 127 and accompa-
nying text. 
71. For this understanding of the underlying, democracy promoting purposes of rights 
protection in the American context, see the analysis of the Carolene Products footnote 
in J.H. ELY, Democracy and Distrus,, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1980. 
For an argument in favour of judicial protection of constitutional principles in the face 
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In cases implicating shifting meanings, the judiciary adopts a large and 
liberal interpretation to ensure the continued relevance of texts that cannot 
or should not be easily altered72. 
In Epiciers no question of constitutionally protected rights was at 
issue and there has been no historical change in the social role or meaning 
of a surety. In the absence of either of these justificatory conditions, and 
in the presence of strong doctrinal, textual and legislative intent arguments 
to support the conclusion, an expansive interpretative approach does little 
to advance the Court’s reasoning. What adoption of the general interpre-
tive principle unconstrained by justificatory conditions does accomplish 
is the arrogation of substantial institutional power to the judiciary73. In 
cases where the judiciary wishes to interpret provisions against unam-
biguous legislative language, it appeals to an expansive approach to justify 
its actions74. 
We saw above that explicit, legislative codal amendment raised prob-
lems of institutional competence : legislative provisions typically seek to 
resolve discrete problems, whereas codal articles do not ; legislators are not 
as sensitive to the exigencies of codal logic and structure as are experts ; 
and legislators are subject to political pressures, whereas experts typically 
are not75. By contrast, implicit amendment raises problems of democratic 
legitimacy, understood in two senses. 
of legislative measures that depart from them, see R. DWORKIN, Freedomss Law: The 
Moral Reading of the American Constitution, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University 
Press, 1996, at 30-31. This approach to rights interpretation in the Canadian context is 
evident in the Court’s justifications for a substantive approach to s. 15 interpretation. See 
e.g. Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143. L’Heureux Dubé 
J. was perhaps the most insistent proponent of such an approach. See e.g. her reasons 
in Gosseiin v. Québec (Attorney General), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429. 
72. Supra, note 22 and accompanying text. 
73. See P.W. HOGG, Constitutionll Law of Canada, looseleaf, Toronto, Carswell, 1997, at 
33-18 for this effect of a large and liberal interpretative approach. 
74. See for an example of such an approach the majority reasons in Caisse populaire Desjar-
dins de Val Brillant v. Blouin, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 666. See the majority reasons in National 
Trust Co. v. H & R Block Inc, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 160 for a common law example of such 
an approach to statutory interpretation. 
75. There is a vast literature on the problem of agency capture, wherein expert opinion is 
co-opted for political ends. See in the law reform context R. E. SCOTt, “The Politics of 
Article 9”, (1994) 80 Va. L. Rev. 1783 at 1804. This problem is beyond the scope of the 
present paper, but I suggest that the risk of capture can be reduced through consulta-
tion processes that elicit a wide range of opinions, public participation in the reform 
institute’s activities, and carefully designed appointment and management practices. 
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First, the explicit and clear meaning of codal text should not be over-
ridden because the judiciary, resorting to an expansive interpretive approach 
or relying on academic commentary or both, feels it prudent to do so. This 
constraint is particularly important in cases where the justificatory condi-
tions for adopting an expansive interpretation are not present, but applies 
even in cases involving individual rights or shifting textual meanings. The 
scope of legitimate appeal to these conditions is limited by the text itself : 
absent an explicit legislative provision permitting judicial review of the 
C.C.Q., interpretations against the express, unambiguous and determinate 
meaning of the codal text are democratically illegitimate. The significance 
of this constraint on the judiciary emerges when we recall that the C.C.Q.’s 
legislative and intellectual world is closer to de la Morandière’s than Plani-
ol’s. Because the codal text can be and is altered by legislative means, the 
judiciary should not override the democratic will as it is expressed in the 
legislative choice to amend or not amend that text. 
Second, because a civil code is a civil constitution and repository of 
social norms, citizens should be actively engaged in its reform. Participa-
tion can take two forms. Affected citizens should be consulted about any 
prospective changes. But opportunities for consultation, without more, may 
simply give more voice to parties who are already interested and exclude 
those who do not recognize their stake in codal reform. The legislative 
process may be captured by interests groups, and the agency I propose 
should seek to widen the circle of participants in codal reform. Therefore, 
participation in the context of codal reform should also have an educative 
aspect. Citizens should be assisted in understanding their interest in codal 
change and its significance. Neither the judiciary nor the academy is obvi-
ously competent to facilitate either form of participation. 
In brief, any codal oversight body will have to overcome the weak-
nesses inherent in the above-discussed institutions. It will involve expert 
input that is sensitive to the internal logic and normative purposes of the 
code, while ensuring citizen participation and overcoming the concerns 
about partiality that the normal legislative process gives rise to. These 
concerns about expertise and representation have been the focus of law 
reform debate in Canada. I turn now to a consideration of that debate both 
to highlight the general stakes underlying law reform agency proposals, and 
to introduce my proposals for codal reform agency design. 
On this last point, see R.A. MaCDONALD, “The Acoustics of Accountability - Towards 
Well-Tempered Tribunals”, in A. SaJó (ed.), Judicial Integrity, Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2004, 141. 
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2.2 Law Reform in Canada 
In the mid nineteen-nineties, the Federal Department of Justice 
convened several conferences and commissioned study-papers and consul-
tations that addressed the need for a new federal law reform body and its 
potential design. These contributions raised issues that had been the subject 
of sporadic academic attention since Allen Linden’s 1966 article “The 
Challenge of Law Reform.”76 That discussion culminated in an exchange 
between Professors Macdonald and Hurlburt in the Alberta Law Review11, 
on the eve of the creation of the Law Commission of Canada78. 
This debate centered on several issues. The first, threshold question in 
a discussion about a law reform agency is whether it is necessary. Necessity 
is understood in two senses. On the one hand, the necessity or even utility 
of such an institute can be measured against direct political engagement ; 
where monetary and personal resources are tightly limited, this dichotomy 
often presents an either/or choice for potential participants in law reform 
efforts79. On the other hand, the degree to which a law reform institute is 
76. (1966) 9 Can. Bar J. 268. For other notable contributions to the literature, see G. SAWER, 
“The Legal Theory of Law Reform”, (1970) 20 U.T.L.J. 183 ; L.C.B. GOWEr, “Reflections 
on Law Reform”, (1973) 23 U.T.L.J. 256; A. MaCKlIN, “Law Reform Error: Retry or 
Abort”, (1993) 16 Dal. L.J. 395 ; J. BeeTZ, “Reflections on Continuity and Change in Law 
Reform”, (1972) 22 U.T.L.J. 129; H.W. HURLBURT, Law Reform Commissions in the 
United Kingdom, Austraiia and Canada, Edmonton, Jurlilber, 1986 ; J.N. LYON, “Law 
Reform Needs Law Reform”, (1974) 12 Osgoode Hall L.J. 421 ; R. SaMeK, “A Case for 
Social Law Reform”, (1977) 55 Can. Bar Rev. 409. 
77. R.A. MaCDONALD, “Recommissioning Law Reform”, (1997) 35 Alta. L. Rev. 831 ; W.H. 
HURLBURT, “The Origins and Nature of Law Reform Commissions in the Canadian 
Provinces : A Reply to ‘Recommissioning Law Reform’ by Professor RA. Macdonald”, 
(1997) 35 Alta. L. Rev. 880. 
78. For a description of the Law Commission’s mandate and organization, see RA. 
MaCDONALD, “Law Reform and its Agencies”, (2000) 79 Can. Bar Rev. 99. See also its 
enabling legislation, An Act Respeciing the Law Commission of Canada, S.C. 1996, c. 
9. 
79. F e d e r a l LAW REFORM CONFERENCe, ATLANiIC INSt i tuTE oF CRIMINOLOGY, Final 
Repor,, 1993 (unpublished); see also K.E. aSBURY & R.G HANN, Prairie Consultation 
on Law Reform, 1993 (unpublished); LAW REFORM DIVISION, Creating a New Law 
Reform Commission of Canada: A Consultation Paper, 1994; CANADIAN INSTITUTE 
FOR THe ADMiniSTRATION oF JuSTICe, Creating a New Law Reform Commission : The 
Judicial Perspective, 1994 ; K. aShBURy & R. HANN, Department of Justice Law Reform 
Consultation: Universtty of Toronto, 1994; LAW REFORM DIVISION, Proposal for the 
Creation of the Law Commission of Canada, 1995. 
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necessary can be measured against either the adequacy of existing institu-
tional processes of legal change or incremental improvements on them80. 
Assuming that a law reform agency is necessary, the related ques-
tions of composition and outputs arise. The question of who participates 
in a law reform agency’s operations can be subdivided into two questions. 
The first goes to the issue of the kind of expertise that is required81. What 
should be the proportion of legal and other experts in a law reform agency’s 
operations, or put another way, how multidisciplinary should a law reform 
agency be ? The second sub-question under the general question of agency 
composition raises a concern about the extent of lay participation : how 
expert should a law reform agency be ? Questions related to outputs track 
those that are subsumed within the composition inquiry. Should a law 
reform agency’s products be primarily doctrinal or multi-disciplinary in 
nature? Should its products be primarily directed to expert or popular 
audiences ? 
Operational issues are related to these two sets of questions but remain 
distinct. These concerns include funding and costs82, degree of institutional 
independence83 and questions about how consultation and outputs are 
generated. These last kinds of questions touch on the underlying purposes 
80. J. O 'REILLY, Toward a New National Law Reform Body : Consultation Paper for the 
Department of Justice, 1994 (unpublished). 
81. Each of the questions in the paragraphs that follow was duplicated in most, if not all of 
the consultations and proposals cited in note 79. 
82. In Canada today, there are a variety of models of law reform agency funding. Some, like 
the B.C. Law Reform Institute, have diverse sources of funding, including professional 
associations, government departments, and private firms : online : [http ://www.bcli.org/] 
(date accessed : 27 February, 2005). The Law Commission of Canada’s enabling statute 
envisages diverse sources of funding (s. 4(e), (f) and (g)) but its annual report suggests 
that virtually all of its funding comes from Parliamentary appropriations : online : [http :// 
www.lcc.gc.ca/en/about/rappors//2002/ra2002/pdf/Repor__LCC_en.pdf](date accessed: 
27 February, 2005). The Alberta Law Reform Institute is primarily funded by the Depart-
ment of Justice and Alberta Law Foundation, and is provided institutional facilities, and 
small funding by the University of Alberta. The Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Nova 
Scotia law reform commissions are all jointly funded by their respective provincial 
Departments of Justice and Law Foundations. 
83. Typically, law reform bodies in Canada have had some degree of independence from the 
executive and the legislature. Their research agendas may arise in consultation with the 
Justice Minister, they may receive references from him or her, and they are ultimately 
accountable to the legislature. However, they typically have considerable latitude in 
setting their research agendas and pursuing individual projects. See e.g. the enabling 
legislation of the LAW COMMISSION oF CANADA, supra, note 78. See also the discussion 
of design measures that safeguard law reform agency independence in HURLBURT, supra, 
note 76 at 360-62, 450-60. 
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of a law reform agency. If the objectives of and audiences for such an 
agency are primarily professional, then the agency will consult only with 
members of the professional legal community and will create proposals 
that will speak to that community. If, however, a law reform agency’s 
purposes are broader and include a desire to facilitate citizen engagement 
in law reform, then the consultations will be different in form. Under such 
a vision of law reform, the output is necessarily as varied as the kinds of 
audiences that are engaged84. 
2.3 A Menu of Options for Codal Reform 
The above considerations are relevant to a discussion of the codal 
reform agency design85. In Part I, I argued that given shortcomings in the 
existing modes of codal reform, a codal reform institute is necessary. And 
the concerns about expertise and popular participation in the law reform 
context find resonances in my account of the codal reform debate. In the 
following, I suggest a variety of means of incorporating legal, expert and lay 
representation, whether through staffing choices or consultation devices, 
but before I discuss these issues in more detail, I address a preliminary 
question of funding. 
On the coming into force of the C.C.Q., the Quebec legislature presented 
a bill that sought to create a law reform institute86. Commentators have 
noted that this institute never managed to attract a sufficient governmental 
commitment of resources to come into being87, but they have also noted 
that the inconsistencies generated within the C.C.Q. by the current practice 
84. The debates about agency composition, modes of consultation, and types of outputs 
reflect a deeper debate about purposes of law reform. The proponent of an exclusively 
or predominately expert-driven law reform process will tend to evince a rationalizing and 
progressive theory of law : law reform makes rational and improves upon formal legal 
artifacts and institutions (see e.g. HURLBURT, supra, note 76). By contrast, the proponents 
of more populist modes of law reform (also) emphasize opening this rationalizing and 
progressive enterprise to previously excluded voices (see e.g. MaCKLIN, supra, note 76), 
or expanding the scope of the very idea of law and law reform (see e.g. MaCDONALd, 
supra, note 77). For a fuller treatment of this debate see Macdonald & Kong, supra, note 
27. 
85. I have not explicitly dealt with the question of interdisciplinary approaches to codal 
reform, but it seems evident that the task of discerning the codal text’s values and effects 
is not only a task for lawyers, and would benefit from interdisciplinary contributions. 
On the value of such contributions to civil law discourse generally, see P. LEGRAND, 
Fragmenss on Law-As-Culture, Kluwer, Deventer, 1999. 
86. An Act respeciing the Institut québécoss de reforme du droit, S.Q. 1992, c. 43. 
87. J.-M. BRISSon & N. KaSIRer, “Preface” in J.-M. BRISSon & N. KaSIRer (eds.), Civil Code 
of Québec: A Critical Edition, 11th ed., Cowansville, Yvon Blais, 2003. 
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of ad hoc amendments may result in litigation costs greater than the cost of 
maintaining and creating a codal reform institute88. Hence, the legislature 
has an incentive to create such an institute, and given the interest expressed 
by both the Barreau and the Minister in reforming the current system, some 
form of cost-sharing between these two bodies seems plausible89. 
I begin the presentation of reform institute design options by consid-
ering the question of who should constitute a codal reform agency’s staff. 
There are three models. The first is drawn from the research and legislative 
branch of the Barreau du Québec. On that model, the agency would have 
permanent legal staff who are responsible for coordinating research and 
producing reports in particular areas of law90, and a barebones administra-
tive staff91. 
A second possibility is modeled on the now defunct Ontario Law 
Reform Commission92. In that model, the staff would consist of three or 
more appointed commissioners, who may or may not have legal experi-
ence and whose remuneration (and full-or part-time status) would be 
determined by the Lieutenant Governor in Council. There would also be 
an administrative staff93. Much of the research would be undertaken by 
project teams, under the direction of project supervisors, retained by the 
88. Ibid. 
89. See the various cost-sharing devices enumerated in note 82. 
90. From conversation with Vadboncœur J., former head of the research and legislative 
branch of the Barreau du Québec and participant in the Civil Code Revision Office [here-
inafter C.C.R.O.]. The Barreau s organization, particularly the structure of its consulta-
tive bodies, is modeled on that of the C.C.R.O. The C.C.R.O. was organized into over 
40 committees under Professor Crépeau’s chairmanship. Each of these committees 
prepared reports on discrete areas of laws, and engaged in wide-ranging consultations, 
and drafts of these were circulated among interested parties, and the final report was 
also circulated and submitted to a committee charged with harmonizing the reports 
of the various committees. This description comes from the C.C.R.O. Archives, avail-
able online: [http://www.law.library.mcgill.ca/ccro/ccropref.html_] (date accessed: 27 
February, 2005). For a general history and analysis of the C.C.R.O.’s operations, see 
BRIerLEY & MaCDONALD, supra, note 13 at paras. 71-83. 
91. The Alberta Law Reform Institute’s structure is essentially a more elaborate version of 
the Barreau’ s research and legislative branch. See the descriptions online : [http ://www. 
law.ualberta.ca/alri/history_c.html#board] and [http ://www.law.ualberta.ca/alri/orgchart. 
html] (date accessed : 27 February, 2005). 
92. Ontario Law Reform Commission Act, R.S.O. 1990, c-O.24. The commission was sunset 
in 1996. 
93. Enabling legislation could contain a specific requirement that a non-lawyer be a commis-
sioner. See e.g. The Manitoba Law Reform Commission Act, C.C.S.M. c. L95, s. 3(1)(d) 
and Law Reform Commission Act, S.N.S. 1990, c. 17, s. 5(1)(d). 
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Commission, and those project teams would primarily consist of legal 
academics94. 
The third model is drawn from the Law Commission of Canada95. The 
law reform agency would consist of commissioners who are charged with 
formulating and overseeing the research of the agency, only one of whom, 
the president, would work on a full-time basis96. These commissioners need 
not be legally trained, but would have some expertise in a relevant subject 
area. Aside from these individuals, and a skeletal support staff, all partici-
pants in the agency’s work would work on an ad hoc, contractual basis. 
These three models evince varying degrees of interdisciplinary and 
popular reach. The Barreau model is the most jurist-centric and expert-
driven, while the L.C.C. model has the most potential to be interdisciplinary 
and populist. This continuum is also evident in the kinds of consultations 
available to a codal reform agency. For the reasons given above, a codal 
reform institute bears a high burden of interaction with the general public. 
Such interactions can be consultative, in the manner of physical or virtual 
town-hall meetings, where interested parties may come to express their 
opinions. In addition, a codal reform agency could undertake a pedagog-
ical role. It could issue vignettes on its web-site illustrating the overlay 
of everyday normative intuitions with those expressed by the C.C.Q.’s 
regimes97. Particularly where a codal amendment reflects or effects the kind 
of social change described above, the president of a codal reform agency 
could host website discussions. And the codal reform agency might have a 
presence in the media, intervening in print, television and radio media. 
But there are limits to a codal reform agency’s populist reach. Because 
it is moored to a particular artifact of positive law, its activities are 
constrained by the limits of that artifact. A code requires for its composi-
tion authors who are alive to the logic of the positive law. Therefore, a 
94. This description comes from HURLBURT, supra, note 76 at 204-14. 
95. [hereinafter L.C.C.]. 
96. The commissioner s roles are described on the Commission web-site, online: [http://  
www.lcc.gc.ca] (date accessed : 27 February, 2005). 
97. See President’s Messages, online: [http://www.lcc.gc.ca] (date accessed: 27 February, 
2005). In a similar spirit of engagement, the Australian Law Reform Commission and 
the Alberta Law Reform Institute, both invite email submissions to their websites on 
matters of concern to those bodies, online: [http://www.alrc.gov.au/howsub.htm] and 
[http ://www.law.ualberta.ca/alri/consult.html] (date accessed : 27 February, 2005)). For 
an analysis of the complex relationship between the normative commitments expressed 
in everyday life and those expressed in formal legal texts, see D. JuTRAS, “Legal Dimen-
sions of Everyday Life”, (2001) 16 Can. J. of Law & Soc. 45. 
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codal reform agency should provide mechanisms for expert consultation. 
I suggest two kinds of consultation. 
The first would be retrospective. As does the Barreau du Québec, a 
codal reform agency could have standing committees of experts whom it 
would consult, and who would assist in drafting reports on proposed bills. 
The second form of consultation would be prospective. A codal reform 
agency could hold competitions for research papers or colloquia in a broad 
range of highly generalized topics, as does the L.C.C. This process would 
permit the agency to publish reports on areas of potential importance, 
and would assist the agency in framing the debate around or possibly 
precluding, subsequent legislative or judicial interventions. 
The form of the agency’s products would be attentive to the nature 
of the various loci of codal reform. Draft codal provisions are particularly 
appropriate if the agency is responding to legislative action. In response to 
judicial interpretations, the codal reform agency might issue draft reasons 
or case comments to show how courts might better approach a given 
problem of codal interpretation. Finally, the codal reform agency might 
issue guidelines setting out the implications of codal amendments or novel 
judicial interpretations for lawyers, notaries and their clients. 
Although these institutional arrangements and responses directly 
address the problems of expertise and participation raised above, they 
neglect the problem of legislative rent-seeking. Legislatures, even when 
presented with uniform expert and broad popular opinion on a given matter 
may, to placate particularly powerful interest groups, reject such opinion. 
The above-described interaction between the Barreau and the Minister 
of Justice before the Commission Permanente des Institutions suggests 
that public scrutiny of and debate over proposals may lead a government 
occasionally to reverse itself. But I suggest a mechanism that would be 
more public and therefore more subject to popular control. I propose a 
requirement that where the executive intends to present a bill containing 
provisions contrary to the advice of the codal reform agency, the Depart-
ment of Justice would be obligated to justify in writing the executive’s 
rejection of the agency recommendations98. In addition, a legislature faced 
with an unfavorable report from the codal reform body might choose to 
98. See QUÉBeC, La procédure parlementaire du Québec, 2d ed., Québec, Assemblée Natio-
nale, 2003, c. 10 for a general description of the legislative process. The requirement I 
envision could apply at the moment when a bill is presented to the National Assembly: 
see ibid. at para. 10.1, 10.1.1. Alternatively, the requirement could apply at the moment 
when the bill is presented for the approval of the Lieutenant Governor : see ibid. at para. 
10.3.3. 
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enact legislation that affects the C.C.Q., but is not integrated into it. After 
every five years, all such legislation would under my proposal be subject 
to review by the agency which would make recommendations about how 
or whether to integrate it into the Code". These measures would, I suggest, 
provide disincentives to unprincipled rent-seeking behaviour that erodes 
the structure and manifest purposes of the Code and are preferable to 
judicial review which is not authorized or anticipated by the legislature. 
3 Harmonization and Constitutional Challenges 
To this point, I have examined codal amendment as a particular civilian 
response to the general problem of legal change100, and I have analyzed 
the idea of a codal reform agency in light of a long national discussion 
about the form and substance of Canadian law reform. The first analysis 
primarily addressed the normative requirements governing codal change, 
which flow from design features of a civil code, while the second primarily 
directed attention towards designing an institution that can adequately 
respond to concerns about efficacy and legitimacy in the processes of codal 
amendment. 
The critiques and solutions advanced to this point could apply to a 
civil code in any jurisdiction where codal amendment is undertaken through 
normal legislative means. I turn now to those particular features of the 
Canadian constitutional landscape that counsel a high degree of care in the 
process of codal amendment, and suggest additional functions for a codal 
reform agency. In particular, I argue that the specific features of Canadian 
federalism demand close attention from codal amenders and I take as an 
example recent legislative and judicial developments concerning marriage 
and civil unions. In my view, there can be no true federal harmonization 
The Canadian Senate and the checks on delegated legislative powers set out in the Statu-
tory Instrumenss Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-22, aim to serve a publicity-generating control on 
rule-making similar to the one envisioned here. For a discussion of this function of the 
Senate, see C.E.S. FRANKS, “The Senate and Its Reform”, (1987) 12 Queen's L.J. 454 at 
457-64. For this function in the Statutory Instrumenss Act, see s. 3, 4. 
99. The process of periodic review I describe here is similar to that which Professor Arthurs 
has proposed, in the context of legislation and regulations. H.W. ARTHURS, “Regula-
tion-making: The Creative Opportunities of the Inevitable”, (1970) 8 Alta. L. Rev. 315 
at 320. 
100. I do not intend to suggest that analogous concerns and proposals are absent from the 
common law. See e.g. the account of Bentham’s proposed responses to the haphazard 
nature of common law development in G.J. POSTEMa, Bentham and the Common Law 
Tradition Oxford Clarendon 1989. I only argue that the distinctive features of civil 
codes yield a particular set of concerns to which the careful design of a codal reform 
agency and its outputs should respond. 
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unless legislators take care not to draft amendments, and courts take care 
not to interpret federal and provincial competence, in a manner that is out 
of constitutional key101.I begin with a brief survey of legislative situations 
that can give rise to harmonization concerns. 
3.1 Federalism and the Occasions for Harmonization 
Professors Brisson and Morel have developed a typology of federal 
and provincial legislative interactions102. These interactions can take 
explicit or implicit forms. Federal legislation may explicitly refer to provin-
cial law with the aim of ensuring or precluding the latter’s application103. 
An example of the former is criminal law that regulates private activity, 
but explicitly provides that the application of relevant private law is not 
thereby precluded104. An example of the latter is any federal legislation 
that purports to occupy a field of regulation105. In addition to these explicit 
references to provincial law, Parliament may have recourse to two kinds 
of implicit reference. First, federal legislation may adopt, without citation, 
private law terminology that derives from provincial legislative or judicial 
sources106. Second federal legislation may presuppose the existence of but 
not explicitly refer to provincial statutory or regulatory regimes107 This is 
the case most notably with federal legislation creating government agencies 
whose operation is then governed by the applicable private law108 
Morel and Brisson’s typology reflects the focus of harmonization 
efforts on the effects of federal legislation on provincial law, particularly 
101. By “being in constitutional key”, I mean both formal compliance with division of powers 
doctrine and consistency with the functional aims of regulation within a federation. 
102. J.-M. BRISSON & A. M o r e l , “Droit fédéral et droit civil : complémentarité, dissociation”, 
in The Harmonization of Federal Legislation with Quebec Civil Law and Canadian 
Bijuralism, Ottawa, Department of Justice, 1997, 215. 
103. J.-M. BRISSON, “L’impact du Code civil du Québec sur le droit fédéral: une probléma-
tique”, (1992) 52 R. du B. 345 at 353. 
104 See ibid. and citations therein. 
105. See General Motors v. City National Leasing, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641 [hereinafter General 
Motors,, in which the Court set out a variable standard for assessing the constitutionality 
of federal legislation that trenches upon provincial jurisdiction. For particular examples 
of federal legislation that explicitly excludes the application of provincial law, see s. 427 
of the Bank Act, S.C. 1991 c. 46 and s. 13 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, 
R.S.C. 1985, c. 3, both cited in BRISSON & M o R E l , supra, note 102. 
106. BRISSON, supra, note 103 at 352. 
107. Ibid. 
108. Ibid. SeeLymburn v. Mayland, [1932] A.C. 318; Can. Indemntty Co. v.A.-G. B.C., [1977] 
2 S.C.R. 504; Re Upper Churchill Water Rights, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 297. 
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the C.C.Q.109. However, the concerns that motivate harmonization are 
reciprocal110, and the dependence of the C.C.Q. on federal legislation takes 
explicit and implicit forms. The influence from provincial to federal law is 
evident where the C.C.Q. makes explicit reference to federal law111. The 
C.C.Q. articles purporting to regulate the incidents of marriage implicitly 
depend upon federal legislation that regulates the conditions of capacity 
for marriage112. Finally, a codal amendment, like any provincial legislative 
change, can affect federal legislation that implicitly or explicitly depends on 
it, if four conditions are fulfilled: 1) the amendment in pith and substance 
falls within a provincial head of power 2) its effects do not affect the core 
of federal jurisdiction such that the amendment violates interjurisdictional 
immunity 3) if it has more than incidental effects on an area of federal 
competence they are sufficiently related to a valid provincial purpose to 
satisfy ancillary purpose doctrine and 4) its subject matter does not have a 
double aspect and is not operationally incompatible with intra vires federal 
legislation such that paramountcy doctrine is triaaered113 
This reciprocal influence gives rise to problems that flow from the 
unique features of a civil code, specifically division of powers questions. 
Three features of a civil code noted in Part I bear on the present discus-
sion. First, a civil code’s statements of principle have a fixed, canonical 
form. Second, a civil code aims to state exhaustively the jus commune of 
a jurisdiction. Third, and as a corollary of the preceding point, a civil code 
presents the default conceptual apparatus of a private law system. 
Macdonald has addressed the ways in which these features of a civil 
code raise federal harmonization concerns that are absent from discussions 
of the relationship between common law provincial legislatures and Parlia-
109. The legislative product of these efforts is the Federal Law-Civil Law Haamonization 
Act, No. 1, S.C. 2001, c. 4 [hereinafter the Harmonization Act]. 
110. MaCDONALD has argued that provincial legislatures should exercise care in drafting 
legislation to ensure that its assumptions cohere with relevant federal legislation, to the 
extent that coherence is desired. “Harmonizing”, supra, note 10, at 66-67. For a more 
nuanced analysis than the present one of the multiple objectives and spheres of regula-
tion that harmonization should take into consideration, see R. LECKEY, “Harmonizing 
Family Law’s Identities”, (2002) 28 Queens L.J. 221. 
111. Arts. 517 and 2714 make explicit reference to federal law, cited in Brisson & Morel, 
supra, note 102. 
112. Case law has arguably eroded this federal power : see Kerr v. Kerr, [1934] S.C.R. 72 and 
A.G. Alta. v. Underwood, [1934] S.C.R. 635. For a critique of these decisions, see L. 
KATZ, “The Scope of the Federal Legislative Authority in Relation to Marriage”, (1975) 
7 Ottawa L Rev. 384. 
113. For a general discussion of division of powers doctrine, see HOGG, supra, note 73 at c. 
15 & 16. 
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ment. He has also argued that due to the disproportion in number between 
common and civil law jurisdictions in Canada, these distinguishing features 
of a code have given rise to greater dissonance between federal legislation 
and Quebec private law than exists between federal legislation and the 
private law of any common law jurisdiction114. Historically, common law 
categories formed the template for much federal law governing matters with 
private law dimensions115. To Macdonald’s analysis I add a point about 
harmonization that reflects the codal theory set out above and I present 
two division of powers arguments that critique harmonization efforts in 
the area of marriage. 
3.2 Harmonization and Codal Theory 
Harmonization became an area of explicit concern for the federal 
Department of Justice with the coming into force of the C.C.Q.116 This is 
no mere coincidence. Provincial legislatures and courts in common law 
jurisdictions changed the private law in the period between Confederation 
and the coming into force of the C.C.Q. in 1994, yet unlike recodification, 
these changes did not trigger a movement for federal harmonization. Some 
explanations for this difference touch on the unique features of a civil code 
and of codal change. Because a civil code aims to state exhaustively the 
jus commune of a jurisdiction, the wholesale legislative change effected 
by recodification necessarily and radically alters the relationship between 
federal law and the law of Quebec. It is inconceivable that the legislature 
and courts of any common law province could cause as vast and discrete 
a change across all areas of private law as did the enactment of the C.C.Q. 
Since no analogous scale of change is institutionally possible in any un-
codified jurisdiction, no analogous response from the federal government 
is required. 
Furthermore, as noted, the civil code expresses the basic normative 
commitments of Quebec society and such commitments are reflected in the 
default private law vocabulary that provides the conceptual structure upon 
which significant areas of federal legislation depend for their application in 
the province of Quebec. Recodification is necessary when a code ceases 
to reflect the fundamental commitments of its society, and recodification 
114. See “Harmonizing”, supra, note 10 at 105. 
115. VALCKe, supra, note 8; BRISSON & MOREL, supra, note 102; GERVAIS, infra, note 116. 
116. For a brief history of harmonization efforts in Canada, see M.-C. GERVAIS, Harmoniza-
tion and Dissonance : Language and Law in Canada and Europe , in The Haamonization 
of Federal Legislation with the Civil Law of the Province of Quebec and Canadian 
Bijuralism, vol. 1, Ottawa, Department of Justice Canada, 2001. 
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necessarily shifts the content and expression of basic norms. No equiva-
lent change in a common law jurisdiction is possible because common 
law institutions, as a matter of theory and method, express normative 
change in a very different and more modest way. Theorists from Mans-
field to Postema have understood that common law courts adjudicating 
private law disputes express normative principles in a dialogue conducted 
across time, and they do so by gradually altering the form and substance 
of legal concepts117. Civilian systems tend to mark radical new beginnings 
with new codes118, whereas common law systems are characterized by an 
incrementalist ethos. The entering into force of the C.C.Q. attracted federal 
harmonization attention in part because it was a new beginning. Legal 
innovations in the common law provinces did not attract similar attention, 
in part because such beginnings are precluded by common law theory and 
methodology. 
3.3 Codal Change and the Division of Powers : 
A Less Than Federal Response 
I turn now to the federalism issues raised by codal change. Recodifica-
tion, as a civilian mode of expressing and effecting legal change, can give rise 
to unique challenges in a federal state. Me Pourbaix of the Federal Depart-
ment of Justice has summarized one problem and offered an explanation 
117. Mansfield’s dictum that the common law works itself pure across time in Omychund v. 
Barker (1744), 1 Atk. 21,26 E.R. 15 at 23, and the title and content of Professor POSTEMA'S 
article, “On the Moral Presence of Our Past”, (1991) 36 McGill L. J. 1154 express this 
point. The existence of extensive statutory regimes in common law jurisdictions changes 
this dynamic (see G. CALABRESi, The Common Law in the Age of Statutes, Cambridge, 
Mass., Harvard University Press, 1982), but not fundamentally. Whether the responsi-
bility for principled change in a common law jurisdiction falls on courts or legislatures, 
the resulting change will tend to be incremental, since both institutions typically and 
paradigmatically respond to particular, rather than universal concerns. 
118. For a discussion of this feature of civil codes, see “Codification”, supra, note 6 and 
for an examination of the scope of change triggered by recodification, see VALCKe, 
supra, note 11. Radical constitutional changes can create a similar sense of new begin-
nings. For a discussion of such change in the American context, see the analysis of the 
Reconstruction Amendments in B. aCKERMAN, We the People : Foundaiion,, Cambridge 
Mass., Harvard University Press, 1991. In the Canadian context, the Charter effected a 
similar “revolution.” See B. MCLAChLIN, “Freedom of Religion and the Rule of Law : A 
Canadian Perspective”, in D. FARROW (ed.), Recognizing Religion in a Secular Society: 
Essays in Pluralism, Religion, and Public Policy, Montreal, McGill-Queens University 
Press, 2004, 12. 
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for the federal legislative response119. The C.C.L.C. predated Confedera-
tion, and several of its articles regulated areas that were to become matters 
of exclusive federal concern under the Constitution Act, 1867. When the 
Quebec legislature brought the C.C.Q. into force, it could not validly purport 
to amend those articles because their subject matter fell outside its compe-
tence. The provincial legislature’s comprehensive revision of the Code ran 
up against limits imposed by division of powers doctrine. 
In response to this state of affairs, s. 3 of the Federal Law-Civil Law 
Harmonization Act, No. 1 repeals all pre-confederation C.C.L.C. articles 
within exclusive federal legislative competence. The articles relating to 
capacity for marriage receive special treatment120 ; according to s. 4 of the 
Harmonization Act, Parliament intends the legislation to regulate only the 
province of Quebec121. 
As Pourbaix notes, Parliament’s motivation for regulating in this area 
is clear. Common law principles in provinces other than Quebec regulate 
capacity for marriage, where the federal government has not legislated 
in the area. By contrast, in Quebec, absent the Harmonization Act there 
would be a reversion to pre-C.C.L.C. federal common law or super-eminent 
federal principles if Parliament were simply to have revoked the applicable 
articles of the C.C.L.C.,122 or anachronistic regulation if the C.C.L.C. provi-
sions were to have continued in force. But it is unclear why Parliament 
should act only to avoid these problems rather than to legislate uniformly 
across the country. Since the underlying purpose of vesting jurisdiction 
over marriage in the federal government seems to have been to ensure 
119. M.-N. POURBATX, “S-4: A First Harmonization Bill”, in The Harmonization of Federal 
Legislation with the Civil Law of Quebec and Canadian Bijuralism, vol. 6, Ottawa, 
Department of Justice Canada, 2001. 
120. Section 3(1) reads : 
The provisions of the Civil Code of Lower Canada, adopted by chapter 41 of the Acts of 
1865 of the legislature of the Province of Canada, entitled An respeciing the Civil Code 
of Lower Canada, are repealed in so far as they relate to subjects that fall within the 
exclusive competence of the Parliament and have not been expressly repealed. 
121. Section 4 reads: “Sections 5 to 7, which apply solely to the Province of Quebec, are 
to be interpreted as though they formed part of the Civil Code of Quebec." Section 5 
reads : “Marriage requires the free and enlightened consent of a man and a woman to 
be the spouse of the other”; s. 6: “No person who is under the age of sixteen years 
may contract marriage” ; and s. 7 : “No person may contract a new marriage until every 
previous marriage has been dissolved by death or by divorce or declared null.” 
122. On the federal common law, see S. SCOTt, “Canadian Federal Courts and the Constitu-
tional Limits of Their Jurisdiction”, (1982) 27 McGill L. J. 137 at 144. 
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national uniformity123, Parliament should have chosen to pass legislation 
of national application to achieve this purpose. Note that this is what it 
achieves with its proposed same sex marriage legislation124. 
Instead, the federal government chose to regulate differently in Quebec 
and the common law provinces and in so doing potentially frustrated the 
interest in uniformity that seems to underwrite federal regulation in the 
area of marriage125. With the Act Parliament has chosen to regulate the 
federal common law through the traditional institutions for regulating the 
jus commune in common and civil law jurisdictions : the Act defers to 
common law judgments in the common law jurisdictions and inscribes 
regulation in the C.C.Q. Although this resolution has a certain elegance 
when viewed through a bijuridical lens, the real and constant potential for 
diversity it creates, as between the common law provinces and Quebec, 
undercuts the federal interest in this area in national uniformity. In the 
absence of federal legislation that has nation-wide application even if there 
is uniformity among all common law courts there is always the possibility 
of divergence between those provinces’ substantive rules on capacity for 
marriage and Quebec’s126 
123. I do not mean to argue that uniformity is the only justification for federal competence. 
As Professor Schneiderman has noted, the exercise of federal power may be restrained 
to ensure the productive local exploitation of property. See D. SCHNeiDERMAN, “Consti-
tutional Interpretation in An Age of Anxiety : A Reconsideration of the Local Prohibition 
Case”, (1996) 41 McGill L. J. 411. Moreover, a “local option” has the effect of providing 
for significant provincial autonomy within a general federal legislative framework. See 
e.g. A.-G. Ont. v. A.-G. Can.(Local Prohibition,, [1896] A.C. 348 (P.C.). For a general 
discussion of the logic of subsidiarity in the Canadian federation, see 114957 v. Hudson, 
[2001] 2 S.C.R. 241 at para. 3. 
These other goals of a federation notwithstanding, the most compelling motivation for 
vesting the federal government with jurisdiction over marriage is national uniformity. 
See HOGG, supra, note 73 at 26-1 to 26-2; KATZ, supra, note 112 at 396; Hellens v. 
Densmore, [1957] S.C.R. 768 at 785 (per Rand J.); Teagle v. Teagle, [1952] D.L.R. 843 
(B.C.S.C.). 
124. Proposal for an Act respeciing certain aspects of legal capactty for marriage for civil 
purposes, Order in Council P.C. 2003-1055, s. 1. 
125. Supra, note 112. 
126. I do not suggest that the only relevant sub-federal units in Canada are Quebec and the 
common law provinces ; I emphasize these entities only because in this instance, the 
federal government’s legislative line-drawing along the civil law-common law cleavage 
causes a federalism problem. 
Moreover, I acknowledge that prior to the introduction of the Harmonization Act there 
was precisely the diversity that I identify in the main text. The legislation did not, there-
fore, create greater diversity than existed previously. Nonetheless, the point remains that 
Parliament failed to legislate to achieve uniformity and as a consequence did not actively 
pursue the goal that underwrites federal competence in this area. 
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3.4 Codal Change and Division of Powers : 
Judicial and Provincial Missteps 
In the foregoing I noted that Parliament’s response to recodification 
did not accord with the functional objectives that underlie the federal 
government’s competence over the capacity to marry. In what follows, 
I suggest that the Supreme Court of Canada and the Quebec legislature 
have together raised a set of thorny division of powers problems related 
to marriage and civil unions. In my view, careful scrutiny of the Reference 
re Same Sex Marriage121 reasoning with respect to the federal competence 
over marriage, and of its brief analysis of the civil union, reveals prob-
lems in the conclusion that Quebec’s civil union legislation is intra vires. 
I contend that on its own terms, the Court’s reasoning should lead to the 
opposite conclusion. This section extends my reflection on the normative 
stakes implicated by codal amendment in the Canadian federation. In my 
view, when Canadian courts opine on and the Quebec legislature amends 
the civil code, they should not only be cognizant of the C.C.Q.’s internal 
harmonics, as I suggested in Part I. The courts and the Quebec legislature 
should also be sensitive to the effects their efforts have on the division of 
powers. 
In order to broach what I consider to be the division of powers prob-
lems that are raised by the Court’s reasoning in the Referenee and the 
C.C.Q.’s regulation of civil unions, it is first necessary to set out some 
general background concerning the place of marriage in division of powers 
doctrine. Commentators have argued that absent the Constitution’s alloca-
tion of powers, all aspects of marriage would naturally fall within property 
and civil rights128. Supreme Court reasons and federal legislative behav-
iour suggest that this is also the view of the courts and Parliament. In re 
Marriage Laws299 holds that regulation of solemnization falls under provin-
cial jurisdiction under s. 92(12), even when breach of a provincial regulatory 
regime would affect the validity of a marriage. Subsequent Supreme Court 
127. 2004 SCC 79 [hereinafter Reference]. 
128. For instance, H. BRUN & G. TREMBLAY, Droit constitutionnel, Cowansville, Yvon Blais, 
2002 at 485 argue that whatever conflicts of laws problems that might have attended 
exclusive provincial control over marriage and divorce are less significant than the prob-
lems raised by making them heads of federal power. But see S.I. BuSHNELl , “Family Law 
and the Constitution”, (1978) 1 Can. J. Farn. L. 202 for the claim that it was precisely the 
intent of the framers to exert federal control over the provinces in this matter. See also 
HOGG, supra, note 73 at 26-2 for a claim that the potential comity problems of permitting 
marriage and divorce to fall within provincial jurisdiction warrant federal competence 
in these matters. 
129. (1912) 46 S.C.R. 132. 
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case-law has further eroded the scope of federal competence over marriage, 
as solemnization has been broadly interpreted to include parental consent 
requirements, which more obviously engage capacity concerns130. Finally, 
Parliament has been relatively silent in its regulation of the incidents of 
marriage131. 
Despite this general trend towards provincial control over marriage, 
regulation of the conditions of capacity for marriage remains a matter of 
federal competence. The Court in the Referenee affirmed this proposi-
tion, and seemed to expand the federal competence, via its analysis of 
the meaning of marriage under s. 91(26). The Court adopted a large and 
liberal interpretation, and held that proponents of a fixed definition, which 
excluded same-sex couples, could not identify an “objective core” for 
marriage—beyond the condition limiting marriage to two people—which 
is supported by a uniform social consensus (para. 27). The Court concluded 
that in the presence of contrary opinions (para. 25), it could not adopt a 
definition of marriage that excluded same-sex couples. In effect the Court 
placed the onus for reading an exclusion into the constitutional definition 
of marriage on those who wanted to institute the exclusion : where there 
is uncertainty about the scope of marriage under s 91(26) exclusion is 
impermissible132 
130. KATZ, supra, note 112. 
131. The federal legislative silenceis especially striking when compared to Parliament’s more 
expansive efforts under the Divorce Act to regulate the consequences of divorce in a 
manner that arguably reaches into property and civil rights matters. For a discussion of 
the problem of drawing principled distinctions between the federal divorce power and 
the provinces’ property and civil rights jurisdiction, see BRUN & TREMBLAY, supra, note 
128 at 486-87. Zacks v. Zacks, [1973] S.C.R. 891 upheld the corollary support provisions 
of the Divorce Act. 
132. It is unclear why the burden should lie in this way. The Court’s embrace of large and 
liberal interpretative principles most obviously entails the rejection of approaches that 
view either custom (para. 25) or legislative intention (para. 30) as absolute limits to 
novel constitutional interpretation. The Court’s reasoning does not, however, clearly 
indicate what level of social consensus should be required for a court to entrench a social 
consensus in a constitutional definition, nor does it suggest how this consensus should be 
discerned. By contrast, where there is virtual social unanimity, as there is, for instance, 
on the condition that marriage consist of only two individuals, exclusion of conjugal 
relationships consisting of more than two individuals from the constitutional definition of 
marriage is permissible. The same reasoning would apply to restrictions on consanguinity 
and the number of marriages that individuals can be party to at a given moment. The 
Court does note that interveners were unanimous in their opinion that marriage should 
be restricted to two persons (para. 27) but it would be unreasonable to infer from this 
statement that the degree of consensus among interveners should determine the meaning 
of constitutional language. 
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The following is, I suggest, a reasonable interpretation of how the 
reasons bear on the scope of federal power over marriage. The Court 
should be understood to be saying that where there is sufficient social 
consensus to generate federal legislation, which rests on a given definition 
of marriage, the Court will not find the definition to fall outside the ambit 
of s. 91(26). The result of such an interpretation is that the Court’s discus-
sion of social consensus and core meanings is superfluous. The opinion 
reduces to a statement about Parliamentary supremacy vis-à-vis the scope 
of the constitutional meaning of marriage : Parliament can define marriage 
for the purposes of s. 91(26). 
Such a holding is normatively untenable as it permits one level of the 
federation to define the scope of its own competence. The Court held that 
“[t]he dominant characteristic ... is apparent from its plain text : marriage 
as a civil institution” (para. 16). Yet as colourability doctrine suggests, 
legislative characterization should not be determinative of the question of 
competence133. Under the Court’s reasoning, it is unclear how legislation 
that Parliament labeled marriage could ever be found to be ultra vires134. 
Moreover, in undertaking such a line of reasoning, the Court avoids 
identifying the exclusive core of the federal competence over marriage, 
although it offers several unhelpful hints throughout the reasons135. The 
It may be that s. 15 concerns motivated the Court’s definition of the scope of competence 
over marriage, and that these concerns constrain the otherwise unmanageably broad 
definitional approach described in the text above. These motivations are not, however, 
evident in the division of powers analysis. For a discussion of the interaction between 
s.15 and the definitional question, see S. LOOSEMoRE, “EGALE v. Canada: The Case 
for Same-Sex Marriage”, (2002) 60:1 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 43 and J.-A. PICKEL “Judicial 
Analysis Frozen in Time: EGALE Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)”, (2002) 
65 Sask. L. Rev. 243. 
133. A.S. a B e l , “The Neglected Logic of 91 and 92”, (1969) 19 U.T.L.J. 487 at 494. 
134. It may be that the Court simply accepts the legislative characterization, in the absence of 
a convincing contrary indication that the legislation improperly reaches into provincial 
competence. However, on its face, the reasoning is over-broad. 
135. I am aware of the debate between formalist and functionalist approaches to Canadian 
federalism. The former, it is said, understand the division of powers in terms of exclusive 
fields of competence, while the latter favour federalism doctrines that admit overlapping 
fields of competence. For excellent accounts of this debate, see B. RYDER, “The Demise 
and Rise of the Classical Paradigm in Canadian Federalism : Promoting Autonomy for 
the Provinces and First Nations”, (1990-1991) 36 McGill L.J. 308 and J. LECLAIR, “The 
Supreme Court of Canada’s Understanding of Federalism : Efficiency at the Expense 
of Diversity”, (2003) 28 Queen's L. J. 411. 
In this paper, I do not intend to stake out a position in the debate, but rather advance the 
modest claim that even under a functionalist approach to federalism, it is necessary to 
circumscribe the limits of the heads of competence, and thereby to define their cores. It is 
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Court suggests that marriage entails conjugal relationships, cannot currently 
extend to multiple partners, and is at the present time and from the perspec-
tive of the state, neither a religious nor exclusively heterosexual institution. 
But since each of these characteristics could apply equally to the civil 
union and the Court reasons that no vires problems arise between the two 
regimes, these suggestions do not assist in identifying the exclusive core of 
the federal jurisdiction over marriage. The Court does not offer the kinds 
of guidelines that it has for identifying the core of federal competence over 
criminal law136 or trade and commerce137. Taken together with the priority 
the Court gives to federal legislative characterization such reasoning does 
not permit substantive judicial review of legislation and simply defers to 
the legislative choice of form138. 
The Court further complicates matters when it comments on the 
Quebec legislature’s inclusion of the civil union regime within the C.C.Q. 
In so commenting, the Court directly engages this Part’s concern with how 
in my view futile to for instance characterize a subject matter as having a double aspect, 
unless one has some idea of the substantive contours of the two heads of constitutional 
competence that are at issue. By failing to define adequately what marriage is, for the 
purposes of the division of powers analysis, the Court has failed to provide even this 
minimum level of guidance. 
136. Reference re Validtty of Section 5(a) of the Dairy Industry Act, [1949] S.C.R. 1 
137. Supra, note 105. The Court in the banking context has undertaken an analysis analogous 
to its Reference reasoning when it determined the scope of federal competence over 
banking. The Court’s resolution of that question, like its reasoning in the Reference is 
unsatisfactory as it seems to make legislative self-characterization determinative of the 
vires question. The Court in Canadian Pioneer Management v. Labour Relaiions Board 
of Saskatchewan, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 433 rejected a functional test for determining whether 
an institution is a bank and adopted an “institutional test” : an institution is a bank only if 
it is identified as such in the Bank Act. Like the Court’s reasoning in the Referenc,, this 
holding is, in my view, unduly deferential to federal legislative self-characterization. 
138. Supra, note 133. The desirability of judicial review in federalism matters has been the 
subject of scrutiny and debate. For example, in Canada, Professor Weiler has urged a 
policy of judicial restraint. P.C. WEILER, “The Supreme Court and the Law of Canadian 
Federalism”, (1973) 23 U.T.L.J. 307. In the U.S., Wechsler famously argued that the 
American federal system’s political processes and institutional structures are adequate 
to the task of regulating federalism. H. W E C h S l e r , “The Political Safeguards of Feder-
alism”, (1954) 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543. 
I assume that Constitutional text governing division of powers requires reasoned articu-
lation of its underlying principles, and I advocate judicial oversight to the extent required 
to achieve this end. I consider this view to be in the mainstream of Canadian Consti-
tutional thought, as it is articulated, in for e.g. W.R. LEDERMAN, “The Classification of 
Laws and the British North America Act”, in W.R. LEDERMAN (ed.), The Courts and 
the Canadian Constitution, Toronto, McClellan & Stewart, 1964, 177 at 177-78 and J. 
LECLAIR, “Canada’s Unfathomable Unwritten Constitutional Principles”, (2001-2002) 27 
Queen's L.J. 389 at 427-29. 
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division powers doctrine may bear on the process of codal amendment. 
The Court reasons that because civil unions are a relationship short of 
marriage they are valid (para. 33). This language suggests that the Court 
makes the degree of resemblance between the civil union and marriage 
determinative of whether Quebec’s legislation over civil unions is intra 
vires. It is, however, unclear in what way civil unions are a relationship 
short of marriage. One might argue, as do Professors Brun and Tremblay, 
that simple resemblance between federal and provincial regimes does not 
generate a division of powers problem139. But marriages and civil unions 
do not simply resemble one another. The civil union regime, unlike provin-
cial regulation of common law relationships or the effects of marriage 
reproduces all aspects of the marriage regime from capacity to dissolution. 
Indeed Art 521 6 incorporates the civil effects of marriage into the civil 
union by reference and the civil union regime diverges from the marriage 
regime only in minor details140 It is not obvious how civil unions differ 
from marriages if the relationships create virtually identical rights and 
obligations141 
In addition, the civil union regime was originally intended to be a func-
tional equivalent of marriage that filled the lacuna in federal legislation over 
matters of capacity, which excluded same sex couples from marrying142 
and which the Bill that was the object of the Reference aimed to fill. That 
the provincial regime intended to fill the gap in federal regulation over 
marriage can be inferred from the structure of the relationship between 
the civil union and marriage regimes in the C.C.Q. The general category is 
“marriage”, and “civil union” is a variant within that category. This struc-
ture emerges from the organization of the regimes in the text (Marriage is 
Title One, Civil Unions Title One.1), from language that is derivative of 
139. BRUN and TREMBLAY make such an argument: supra, note 128 at 486. 
140. Ibid. These minor differences lie between the capacity requirements and dissolution 
processes. The age of capacity is higher (compare s. 6 of the Act with Art. 521.1(1)) 
and the consanguity requirements are seemingly less stringent under the C.C.Q. regime 
(compare Marriage (Prohibtted Degrees) Act, S.C. 1990, c. 46 with Art. 521.1(2)). Disso-
lution under the civil union regime can be achieved through a consensual notarial act 
rather than exclusively through a judicial process (Arts. 521.12 and 521.13). 
141. In the United States, courts have grappled with the question of when local government 
regulation over partnerships becomes regulation of marriage, and examined the extent 
of resemblance between regimes to decide the question. If local regimes do not closely 
resemble marriage, they do not engage in state regulation and if they do so resemble, 
they do regulate outside of their competence over local matters. See e.g. City of Atlanta 
v. Morgan, 492 S.E. 2d 193 (1997). 
142. See A. ROY, “Partenariat civil et couples de même sexe: la réponse du Québec”, (2001) 
35 R.J.T. 663 at 673-74. 
666 Les Cahiers de Droit (2005) 46 c. de D. 629 
marriage within the articles governing civil unions (see e.g. Art. 521.6) and 
the various incorporations by reference (see e.g. Arts. 521.3, 521.8). The 
amendment that introduced the civil union into the C.C.Q. was intended to 
fill a gap in the federal regime governing capacity to marry, and as we have 
seen, capacity uncontroversially falls the scope of within of the federal 
jurisdiction over marriage. The original primary purpose of the Quebec 
legislature in enacting the civil union legislation was to regulate within the 
core of a federal competence. 
One might argue, as have Brun and Tremblay, that the federal heads 
of power that concern private activity, including section 91(26), are excep-
tions to the general provincial power over property and civil rights143. 
Because the division of powers is exhaustive, this argument continues, at 
least one level of government must have competence over civil unions, 
and given the general structure of the Constitution in private law matters, 
by default, this competence should fall to the provinces. But the Court’s 
reasons blunt the force of this argument. As we have seen, the Court seems 
to reason that provincial legislation over civil unions is intra vires only to 
the extent that civil unions constitute “a relationship short of marriage”. 
Under this reasoning, provincial legislation over civil unions is valid only if 
civil unions and marriages are meaningfully distinguishable. I have argued 
above that they are not. 
Moreover, even if we set aside the claim that degree of resemblance 
is significant in assessing the vires question, and accept that as a default 
rule, private law matters should be regulated by the provinces under their 
property and civil rights power, it is still necessary to examine whether 
a particular law falls within one of the federal exceptions to the general 
property and civil rights power. Since the Court does not define the exclu-
sive core of the federal competence over marriage, it provides no analytic 
tools for assessing whether or not the substance of particular legislation 
falls within this competence. As a consequence, reflexive judicial resort to 
a default rule in favor of provincial jurisdiction, when assessing the civil 
union’s constitutional validity would yield conclusions that are unsup-
ported by reasons144. 
143. Supra, note 128. 
144. For the insight that such failures to give reasons when arriving at conclusions are 
anathema to the judicial role, see H. WEChSlER, “Toward Neutral Principles of Consti-
tutional Law”, (1959) 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1 and L.L. FuLLER, “The Forms and Limits of 
Adjudication”, (1978) 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353. It should be evident from what I have argued 
thus far that I am offering a normative critique of the Court’s reasoning. I therefore do 
not simply accept as determinative of the question the Court’s unanimous holding (in 
obiter) that the civil union regime is intra vires. For the importance of a normative, as 
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An opponent of my analysis of the Court’s reasons and of the consti-
tutionality of the civil union in light of those reasons, might concede that 
the two regimes are functionally identical, but contend that the difference 
in labels is sufficient to differentiate them, thereby vitiating any division of 
powers concerns. Professor Roy has made an argument to this effect145. The 
proponent of this position might argue that the institution called marriage 
necessarily contains religious and heterosexist exclusionary connotations, 
whereas a functional equivalent to marriage, called the civil union, does 
not. The proponent might further argue that these connotations are essen-
tial to the core meaning of marriage, in the same way that the relevant 
public purposes are essential to the core meaning of “criminal matters” 
under s. 91(27)146. Given that the civil union regime plausibly falls within 
the provincial competence over property and civil rights, the proponent of 
this position would conclude that the provincial regime is intra vires. He 
or she might argue that it is the difference in legislative labels that renders 
civil unions a relationship short of marriage. 
The Court and Parliament have precluded this argument. The Court 
has unequivocally stated that for the state, marriage is a civil institution that 
carries no religious meaning147. Moreover, the Court has held that marriage 
under s. 91(26) does not carry exclusionary connotations based on sexual 
orientation148. Parliament in Bill C-38 has labeled the institution of marriage 
“civil marriage” and thereby effectively severed the institution from its reli-
gious antecedents. Beyond this labeling exercise, Parliament conveys the 
disjunction between these antecedents and marriage when it declares in the 
preamble and s. 3 that religious officials are not obliged to perform marriage 
ceremonies against their religious beliefs. Finally, the express wording of 
opposed to purely descriptive approach to federalism analysis, see J.-F. gauDREAULt-
DESBIENS, “The Canadian Federal Experiment, or Legalism Without Federalism ? 
Toward a Legal Theory of Federalism”, in M. CALVo-GARCIA & W. Fe lSTINEr (eds.), 
Federalismo/Federalism, Madrid, Dyckinson, 2004, 79. 
145. Supra, note 142 at 677-78. 
146. Supra, note 136 at 50. 
147. The Court distinguishes the current meaning of marriage from the religious meaning 
it carned at Confederation, as expressed in Hyde v. Hyde (1866), L.R. 1 P. & D. 130. 
The Court reasons at para. 22 : “Hyde spoke to a society of shared social values where 
marriage and religion were thought to be inseparable. This is no longer the case. Canada is 
a pluralistic society. Marriage, from the perspective of the state, is a civil institution.” 
148. The Court draws this conclusion when it states: “In determining whether legislation 
falls within a particular head of power, a progressive interpretation of the head of power 
must be adopted. The competing submissions before us do not permit us to conclude that 
‘marriage’ in s. 91(26) of the Constitution Act, 1867, read expansively, excludes same-sex 
marriage” (para. 29). 
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the provision regulating capacity and the legislative intention articulated in 
the preamble remove any doubt about the inclusiveness of the institution of 
marriage, with respect to sexual orientation. Given these clear statements, 
the substantive identity of the two regimes, and the intention of the Quebec 
legislature in enacting the civil union legislation, it would be unreasonable 
to perceive a meaningful difference, grounded in either religion or sexual 
orientation, between marriage and civil unions. 
There remains a final objection to my position. One might claim that 
legislative and judicial pronouncements notwithstanding, marriage retains 
religious, sexual orientation-related or other semantic content that is tied to 
the institution’s historical meaning. The proponent of this argument might 
aver that marriage carries such meanings even if it also contains contrary 
connotations that are enunciated by the state. Under this argument, the core 
of the federal competence over marriage consists of that semantic content 
of “marriage” which remains outside legislative or judicial control. And 
again, where provincial regulation does not use this label, even if it creates 
a functionally identical regime, no division of powers problem arises. Civil 
unions would be relationships short of marriage, at least in part because 
those entering into them reasonably understand them to be so. 
If this argument is correct, it gives rise to the possibility of legislation 
becoming ultra vires as social mores and understandings change. Imagine 
if over time, marriage either lost the semantic content tied to its historical 
meaning, or civil unions gained that content, such that the meanings of the 
two institutions were to converge and become identical. Under such circum-
stances, legislation under one or the other head of power would become 
ultra vires, not because the legislature acted improperly at the relevant time, 
but because the social meaning of the institutions had evolved. Civil unions 
would cease to be relationships short of marriage. This argument suggests 
that where the pith and substance analysis is driven by the social meaning 
of constitutional terms and where the degree of resemblance between 
social institutions is determinative of the vires question the branches of 
the Constitution’s living tree can grow tangled as meanings shift149 
149. There is another way by which civil unions might fall within the federal competence over 
marriage. Imagine that all or most of the provinces were to adopt civil union legislation 
substantially similar to Quebec’s. Under such circumstances, the interest in national 
uniformity that justifies federal competence over marriage might likewise support federal 
jurisdiction over civil unions. 
Moreover, I should note that the possibility of jurisdictional fluidity I envision here is not 
unique to marriage. The frontiers of the trade and commerce, and peace, order and good 
government powers can similarly shift. The contents of these heads of powers can change 
as activities that previously were intra-provincial and fell within the property and civil 
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In this Part of the paper, I have attempted to demonstrate that codal 
amendment within the Canadian federal state can give rise to thorny chal-
lenges posed by division of powers doctrine and principle. Two examples 
of codal reform were invoked for this demonstration : recodification, which 
yielded a federal legislative response, and the introduction of civil unions 
into the C.C.Q., which Court briefly analyzed in the Referenc.. Two sets of 
concerns were identified in these examples. First, I noted that the federal 
legislative response to recodification should have taken into consideration 
the purposes that underlie the Constitution’s vesting of competence over 
marriage in the federal government. Second, I argued that the Court’s 
reasoning in the Reference was unsatisfactory for two reasons : 1) on its 
own terms, the Court should have come to a conclusion concerning the 
constitutionality of the civil union opposite the one at which it arrived, and 
2) the Court’s nominalist definition of marriage did not permit it to under-
take a substantive assessment of the limits of the federal competence over 
marriage, and par ricochet the Court precluded itself from undertaking a 
serious division of powers analysis of the civil union. 
Finally, if my analyses of the federal harmonization legislation and 
the C.C.Q.’s civil union regime are accurate, several consequences for the 
codal reform institute which I proposed in Part II follow. First, a Quebec 
codal reform institute should make representations to the federal govern-
ment when the latter is in the process of preparing legislation that has 
potential effects on the C.C.Q. These representations would identify divi-
sion of powers objections to the potential federal legislation, grounded in 
either positive law or principle. Second, Canadian codal amenders should 
in all cases aim to harmonize in two directions : they should attempt to 
achieve the internal harmony of the C.C.Q., as well as federal-provincial 
harmonization. Third, the products of the codal reform institute would vary 
according to the nature of the institution addressed. The agency might write 
case comments on judicial reasons, produce legislative provisions which 
would remedy the defects in a given federal legislative regime and through 
colloquia in partnership with the L.C.C. challenge the academy to engage 
actively the kinds of federalism questions raised in this section of the paper. 
Fourth, where social meaning determines the content of constitutional text 
and shapes the contours of the division of powers, a codal reform insti-
tute should assist in clarifying that meaning to safeguard against federal 
rights power take on extra-provincial significance through the creation of externalities or 
coordination problems. See S. ChoUDRY, “Recasting Social Canada: A Reconsideration 
of Federal Jurisdiction Over Social Policy”, (2002) 32 U.T.L.J. 163. 
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or provincial measures that frustrate the purposes of regulating within a 
federation. 
Conclusion 
You must remember this, 
A kiss is just a kiss, a sigh is just a sigh. 
The fundamental things apply 
As time goes by (Herman Hupfeld) 
The three ambitions of this paper are aptly captured by Mr. Hupfeld’s 
evocative lyrics. Part I assessed the difficulties that the passing of time pose 
for the logic and structure of a civil code, elucidated the debate surrounding 
codal change, and set out the purposes and species of codal amendments. 
Part II set out the case for a codal reform agency as a response to the prob-
lems set out in Part I, presented a menu of issues and options to consider 
in the design of such an agency, and raised that most fundamental of issues 
for a civil code, democratic legitimacy. Finally, as do Mr. Hupfeld’s lyrics, 
I interrogated the significance of labeling, as I set out the federalism ques-
tions that change in codal text pose to those who would undertake to 
fashion a federal legislative response to such change, to amend the code 
itself or to offer a judicial opinion about such change. 
The present paper is a prologue in what I hope will be a sustained 
conversation about the normative stakes of codal amendment and the 
processes by which it is undertaken. Even if the particulars of my proposals 
are rejected for monetary or other reasons, I suggest that the broad outlines 
of my analysis may nonetheless guide decision-makers when the form or 
substance of codal text is altered. Ultimately, I hope that in Canada, codal 
theory and federalism principles will guide developments in codal amend-
ment, as time goes by. 
